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ABSTRACT
The power of financial accounting to shape corporate behavior is
underappreciated. Positive accounting theory teaches that even cosmetic changes in
reported earnings can affect share value, not because market participants are unable to
see through such changes to the underlying fundamentals, but because of implicit or
explicit contracts that are based on reported earnings and transaction costs. However,
agency theory suggests that accounting choices and corporate responses to accounting
standard changes will not necessarily be those that maximize share value. For a number
of reasons, including the fact that executive compensation often is tied to reported
earnings, managerial preferences for high earnings generally will exceed shareholder
preferences, leading to share value reducing tradeoffs between reported earnings and net
cash flows. The empirical literature on the details of positive accounting theory is mixed,
but the evidence firmly establishes the power of accounting to shape corporate behavior.
The power of accounting and the divergence of interests have many implications
for courts and policy makers. For example, consideration of proposals to increase
conformity between tax and financial accounting rules as a means of combating tax
sheltering and/or artificial earnings inflation must take into account the incentive
properties of accounting standards and recognize that narrowing the gap between tax
and book income will have economic consequences, however the gap is narrowed. This
Article considers this and other implications of the behavioral effects of accounting
standards, including the possibility of setting accounting standards instrumentally as a
means of regulating corporate behavior, an alternative to tax incentives, mandates, or
direct subsidies.

*

Associate Professor, Boston University School of Law. I have benefited from the helpful
comments of Vic Fleischer, Keith Hylton, Calvin Johnson, Mike Meurer, Alex Raskolnikov, Lynn Stout
and participants in workshops at Boston University School of Law, the Junior Tax Scholars’ Workshop, the
Canadian Law and Economics Association annual meeting, and the National Tax Association annual
meeting. I thank Mark Gauthier for excellent research assistance.

ACCOUNTING AND CORPORATE BEHAVIOR
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................... 3
I. ACCOUNTING THEORY ..................................................................................................... 8
A. The Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis and the Capital Assets Pricing Model .... 8
B. Positive Accounting Theory ..................................................................................... 11
C. Shareholder and Manager Appetite for Earnings ................................................... 13
II. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON ACCOUNTING, SHARE VALUE, AND CORPORATE BEHAVIOR 17
A. Stock Price Reaction to Changes in Mandatory Accounting Standards ................. 17
B. Corporate Response to Changes in Mandatory Accounting Standards.................. 19
C. Stock Option Expense Accounting........................................................................... 20
D. Voluntary Accounting Choice Evidence - Tax/Earnings Tradeoffs ........................ 23
III. DOES ACCOUNTING MATTER? SYNTHESIS OF THE THEORY AND EVIDENCE ............... 26
A. Kamin v. American Express .................................................................................... 27
B. Managerial Opposition to Stock Option Expensing................................................ 29
IV. BOOK-TAX CONFORMITY ........................................................................................... 30
A. Book-Tax Conformity Proposals ............................................................................. 31
B. Issues and Concerns with Book-Tax Conformity Proposals ................................... 32
1. Information Loss .................................................................................................. 32
2. Control of Tax Policy........................................................................................... 33
3. Instability Generally ............................................................................................ 34
4. Politicization of the Financial Accounting Standard Setting Process................. 34
C. Book-Tax Conformity and Corporate Behavior...................................................... 35
1. Accounting and Operational Flexibility and the Book-Tax Tradeoff .................. 35
a. Flexibility in Managing Taxes and Earnings................................................... 36
b. The Book/Tax Tradeoff .................................................................................... 37
2. Discretion and Cross Company Consistency in Financial Reporting ................. 38
3. Book-Tax Conformity and Economic Incentives.................................................. 39
a. Tax Incentives .................................................................................................. 39
b. Accounting Incentives ...................................................................................... 40
c. Economic Consequences of Eliminating Accounting Incentives ..................... 42
4. Economic Consequences and Flexible Book-Tax Conformity............................. 43
D. Further Book-Tax Conformity Alternatives and Alternatives to Conformity ......... 44
V. INSTRUMENTAL ACCOUNTING ...................................................................................... 44
A. How Would Instrumental Accounting Work?.......................................................... 45
B. Benefits of Instrumental Accounting ....................................................................... 46
C. The Costs of Instrumental Accounting .................................................................... 47
1. Impact on Corporate Creditors ........................................................................... 48
2. Degradation of the Usefulness of Financial Reports........................................... 49
3. Lobbying, Regulatory Capture and the Quality of Accounting Incentives .......... 50
4. Institutionalization of the Importance of Reported Earnings .............................. 53
5. Conflict with International Convergence of Accounting Standards .................... 53
6. Other Costs (and Benefits) of Instrumental Accounting ...................................... 54
D. Thinking about Accounting Incentives in a Second Best World ............................. 55
CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................... 57

2

ACCOUNTING AND CORPORATE BEHAVIOR
INTRODUCTION
Financial accounting standards and accounting decisions are vitally important to
the managers of U.S. public companies. Nonetheless, the courts, policy makers, and
legal scholars focusing on corporate law generally ignore accounting whenever they are
able, treating the subject as a black box best left to accounting professionals, without
recognizing the impact of accounting on managerial decision making and corporate
behavior. This is unfortunate. Corporate financial accounting is too important to be left
to the accountants. Courts and policy makers need to understand whether accounting
standards and accounting decisions matter, and if so, how; whether managerial sensitivity
to reported earnings reflects legitimate shareholder concerns, irrational behavior, or
rational, but self-serving behavior; and finally whether accounting standards can serve a
useful policy role in helping to shape managerial and corporate behavior. Consider the
following examples:
In a case described in many corporate law texts and treatises, Kamin v. American
Express,1 the company’s directors voted to distribute to shareholders some depreciated
securities rather than selling the securities and enjoying the benefit of a corporate tax
loss. The plaintiffs’ allegation, accepted by the court in considering the defendants’
summary judgment motion, was that the directors had made a conscious decision to
forego about $8 million in tax savings in order to avoid a $26 million dollar reduction in
reported earnings, even though the $26 million loss was suffered economically and was
clearly reflected on the company’s balance sheet.2 Because the American Express
shareholders would be unable to use the tax loss, the primary beneficiary of this decision
appeared to be the U.S. Treasury. The directors justified sacrificing after-tax cash flow
for higher reported earnings arguing that a $26 million “reduction of net income would
have a serious effect on the market value of the publicly traded American Express
stock.”3
The court held that the board’s good faith decision was protected by the business
judgment rule and dismissed the case.4 The court downplayed the plaintiffs’ allegation
that some of the directors were company managers whose compensation was based in
part on reported earnings. Was the earnings/cash flow tradeoff in the Kamin case
negligent? Was it even rational? Should the court have been more skeptical that the
decision was in good faith and not self-serving behavior on the part of the inside
directors?
Consider next the battle that has been waged over the last decade over the
accounting treatment of compensatory stock options. The Financial Accounting
1

383 N.Y.S.2d 807 (N.Y.Sup. 1976).
The case involved a block of stock that American Express had purchased in Donaldson, Lufken
and Jenrette, Inc. that had declined in value from $30 million to $4 million. The loss on the stock was
water under the bridge. The only question before the directors was whether the stock should be sold by
American Express, providing a tax benefit to offset other income, but also a reduction in earnings; or
distributed to shareholders as a dividend. In the latter case, the alternative selected by the directors, the tax
benefit would be lost entirely – the shareholders would not be entitled to use it, but American Express’s
loss on the stock would be reflected only on its balance sheet, not on its income statement. See id. at 809810.
3
Id. at 811.
4
See id. at 812.
2
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Standards Board (FASB), the private body empowered by the SEC to set accounting
standards, formally proposed in 1993 that stock option expense be recorded and
subtracted from reported earnings similar to all other compensation expense.5 The
corporate lobby managed to defer mandatory expensing for twelve years until FASB
finally forced through a rule in 2004.6
The effect of mandatory option expensing will be to reduce reported earnings for
companies that use options. Corporate interests opposing the new standard have argued
that expensing will reduce share values and drastically reduce or preclude the use of
options as a compensation device.7 Some economists argue that the accounting treatment
is irrelevant and that managerial resistance is irrational by traditional economic ways of
thinking.8 Members of Congress actually have weighed in on this one – but on both sides
of the question.9 Is managerial resistance to option expensing irrational or self-serving,
or does it reflect legitimate concerns about the effect of expensing options on share
value?
Next, increased consistency between financial and tax accounting has been
proposed as a response both to tax sheltering and artificial earnings inflation.10
Differences between financial (or book) accounting and tax accounting allow firms to
exploit tax shelters that decrease taxable income without affecting book income and
artificially inflate reported earnings without incurring higher corporate taxes. Requiring
firms to adopt the same accounting conventions for both purposes would force them to
trade off taxes against reported earnings. Assuming some managerial discretion,
commentators have generally assumed that the primary result of increased book-tax
conformity would be reduced reported earnings, since managers would act to minimize
taxes and maximize after tax cash flows.11 Does this view properly reflect the
importance of reported earnings to management, or would shareholders likely suffer as a
5

See Financial Accounting Standards Board, Exposure Draft: Accounting for Stock-Based
Compensation (1993).
6
See Financial Accounting Standards Board, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No.
123 (revised 2004) (Dec. 2004) (mandating “fair value” accounting for stock options effective beginning in
2005 and 2006).
7
See, e.g., Wick Simmons, The Best Option, WALL ST. J., Jan. 31, 2003, at A10 (“[I]f companies
are forced to treat options like salaries or manufacturing costs, many will decide they can’t afford to
continue this form of potential compensation.”).
8
See Kevin J. Murphy, Explaining Executive Compensation: Managerial Power Versus the
Perceived Cost of Stock Options, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 847, 860 (2002) (arguing that “[t]here is substantial
evidence that managers respond to accounting concerns in ways that seem irrational to financial
economists”).
9
See Patricia M. Dechow et al, Economic Consequences of Accounting for Stock-Based
Compensation, 34 J. ACCT. RES. 1, 3-4 (1997).
10
See, e.g., George K. Yin, Getting Serious About Corporate Tax Shelters: Taking a Lesson from
History, 54 S.M.U. L. REV. 209 (2001); Mihir A. Desai, The Degradation of Corporate Profits (working
paper, June 2004).
11
See, e.g., Calvin H. Johnson, GAAP Tax, 83 TAX NOTES 425 (1999) (arguing that book-tax
conformity would cause a significant drop in GAAP income); Yin, supra note 10, at 227 (noting that a tax
based primarily on financial income could lead some companies to report lower earnings to reduce taxes);
Michelle Hanlon & Terry Shevlin, Book-Tax Conformity for Corporate Income: An Introduction to the
Issues 28 (working paper, Oct. 2004) (noting that book-tax conformity could lead to a race to the bottom on
effective tax rates). To be sure, none of these sources suggest that firms would completely ignore reported
earnings, but the general tenor is that tax effects would likely dominate.
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result of increased book-tax conformity as managers forewent valid tax deductions in
order to keep reported earnings high? More importantly, what would be the broader
economic consequences of eliminating the gaps between financial and tax accounting?
Finally, consider a hypothetical accounting standard change that has the effect of
decreasing reported expenses (and thus increasing reported earnings) related to the
purchase of a certain class of assets. Given managerial sensitivity to reported earnings as
demonstrated in Kamin, the stock option expensing saga, and numerous studies recounted
below, would such an accounting change serve as a valuable incentive device, perhaps as
an alternative to tax incentives? This Article argues that the stock option accounting
regime in place over the last decade has, in fact, acted as an accounting incentive and
helps explain the widespread use of options. This was largely unintentional and probably
not salutary, but the impact of accounting rules on compensation design suggests the
potential for instrumental accounting.
Thoughtful consideration of the foregoing questions requires exploration of
accounting theory and related empirical evidence. Accounting theory seeks to explain
how accounting standards affect share prices and corporate behavior and how firms
choose between permissible standards. One goal of this Article is to introduce the legal
academic community to the dominant theory among accounting researchers today, which
is known as positive accounting theory.12
In brief, positive accounting theory posits that accounting matters because of
transaction costs.13 Absent transaction costs, accounting standards and practices would
be irrelevant because the capital markets are able to “see through” various accounting
presentations to the underlying value of securities as long as (1) there are no tax or other
direct cash flow effects and (2) there is no material change in the information publicly
available to investors.14 The markets cannot be fooled, for example, by a firm switching
its method of financial depreciation. However, a change in accounting standards can
affect a firm’s cash flows if that change affects various explicit or implicit contracts that
are tied to reported financial results. For example, most public companies issue debt that
is protected by accounting-based covenants. In order to ensure sufficient assets to repay
the debt, borrowers typically covenant, inter alia, to maintain a certain level of working
capital and to limit the pool from which dividends may be paid to shareholder investment

12

Although legal academics generally are familiar with the efficient capital markets hypothesis
and the capital asset pricing model, which form the basis of modern accounting theory, references in the
legal literature to positive accounting theory are sparse. A terms and connectors search of the “JLR”
database in Westlaw for “positive accounting theory” produces only nine hits.
13
See generally ROSS L. WATTS & JEROLD L. ZIMMERMAN, POSITIVE ACCOUNTING THEORY
(1986); Ross L. Watts & Jerold L. Zimmerman, Positive Accounting Theory: A Ten Year Perspective, 65
ACCT. REV. 131 (1990); see also infra Part I.B.
14
At one time, researchers concluded based on these theories that accounting standards and
practices were essentially irrelevant. See, e.g., WATTS & ZIMMERMAN, supra note 13, at 72-73; Watts &
Zimmerman, supra note 13, at 133 (discussing accounting irrelevance theory); Robert W. Holthausen &
Richard W. Leftwich, The Economic Consequences of Accounting Choice, 5 J. ACCT. & ECON. 77, 80
(1983) (discussing early tests finding no stock price reaction to changes in accounting techniques except for
changes affecting taxes); see also infra Part I.B.
However, accounting standards seemed to matter in practice, and researchers noticed patterns in
firms’ choices between acceptable accounting standards that were surprisingly regular if accounting were
irrelevant. A fuller theory was required, and positive accounting theory was the result.
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plus accumulated profits.15 Both the violation and renegotiation of debt covenants is
costly. Thus, an accounting change that reduces reported earnings and increases the
chance of covenant violation should reduce expected cash flows and adversely affect
stock prices, particularly for firms that are highly leveraged. But positive accounting
theory suggests that an earnings-reducing change may produce benefits as well. Sticky
earnings-based compensation contracts would become less expensive for shareholders
and the risk of high reported earnings resulting in costly political repercussions (think
windfall profits taxes) would be reduced.
While positive accounting theory explains why shareholders might care about
earnings, there are several reasons to believe that managers’ appetite for high reported
earnings will exceed that of the shareholders. Most importantly, to some extent
managerial compensation is based directly or indirectly on reported earnings. In addition,
managers may hold an honest but mistaken belief that reported earnings directly affect
share value, a position known as the naïve investor view, or they may be socialized into
placing inordinate importance on reported earnings as a result of the excessive attention
that stock analysts place on these figures. As a result there often will be a conflict
between shareholder and managerial preferences for earnings. Managerial agency theory,
which focuses on the irreducible gap between shareholder preference and manager action
in a world of imperfect information, suggests that shareholders will rarely win this
contest. In my view, accounting academics have significantly underestimated the
importance of managerial agency theory in their research. In a sense, the theoretical
thrust of this Article is to more closely intertwine two existing, though heretofore largely
independent, strands of research – positive accounting theory and agency theory.
The empirical evidence, which this Article reviews in some detail, supports this
integrated view.16 The most consistent and robust result from the empirical literature on
accounting and corporate behavior is confirmation of what any practitioner will tell you:
accounting matters; it is not irrelevant. Or, more importantly, managers act as if
accounting mattered. However, although some of the evidence is consistent with the
detailed predictions of positive accounting theory, much of the evidence is equally
consistent with a manager-driven or agency cost theory of accounting choice.
And that brings us back to the questions originally posed and the final goal of this
Article, which is to consider the implications of a more nuanced understanding of
accounting theory and corporate behavior. First, can managerial decisions like those in
Kamin or managerial opposition to stock option expensing possibly be in shareholder
interests? Possibly, but it’s unlikely. Based on our current understanding of accounting
theory, we cannot be certain that the American Express directors in Kamin were negligent
or disloyal, or that managerial opposition to stock option accounting was largely selfserving, but it is reasonable to suspect that this is the case.17 In Kamin, for example, the
decision to forego the corporate sale of securities and the tax benefit in that case in order
to avoid a large earnings hit probably did provide some shareholder benefit. Assuming
that American Express had debt outstanding, the earnings reduction would have pushed
the company closer to technical default on their covenants. For this reason, and not
because the stock market could not see through the transparent ruse of distributing the
15

See WATTS & ZIMMERMAN, supra note 13, at 211.
See infra Part II.
17
See infra Part III.
16
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devalued securities, the market price of American Express would have been negatively
affected. It is almost inconceivable, however, that the adverse stock price effect would
have approached the $8 million tax benefit foregone or that the covenants could not have
been renegotiated for less than $8 million. More importantly, the analysis developed
herein identifies the questions that shareholders and judges should ask in attempting to
determine whether managers’ accounting choices are driven by share value concerns or
are self serving.
Second, positive accounting theory suggests that firms would not adopt a strategy
of ignoring reported earnings and minimizing taxes in order to maximize share value in a
world of increased book-tax conformity. However, this Article argues that managers
would go even further in sacrificing tax benefits for higher reported earnings, in all
likelihood foregoing legitimate tax deductions and impairing share value.18 In addition,
we should think of financial accounting standards as creating incentives just like the tax
rules. Thus, differences between the two sets of rules, such as depreciation rules that
allow firms acquiring capital assets to report higher earnings to investors than to the tax
authorities, can be thought of as tax incentives, accounting incentives, or both; and
increased book-tax conformity, whether achieved by conforming tax with book, book
with tax, or something in between, could have adverse consequences for the economy.
Third, once we recognize that financial accounting standards have strong
behavioral effects and economic consequences, the natural question to ask is whether this
power should be harnessed and explicit accounting incentives embraced as a public
policy tool, a supplement to the direct subsidies, mandates, and tax incentives currently
used by Congress to shape corporate behavior.19
It is an interesting possibility. Unlike tax incentives and direct subsidies,
purposeful adjustments made to accounting standards to influence behavior would have
no direct impact on the public fisc. But there would be costs. First, purposeful deviation
from economic accounting, the accounting treatment that most closely follows the
economics of the transaction, would result in degradation of the information content of
accounting statements and greater costs to the users of these statements.20 A second
potential cost lies in the introduction of additional lobbying into the accounting standard
setting process and the possibility of regulatory capture by the interest group with the
most at stake - management.21 In many ways the costs and benefits of providing explicit
accounting incentives and tax incentives are similar. The difference is that mixed
purposes, congressional involvement, and the attendant lobbying and capture issues are
unavoidable in the tax realm, or perhaps more importantly, are irretrievably entrenched.
This is not the case for financial accounting, which is subject to much less political
infighting today than is tax. Thus, although an omniscient, benevolent, and disinterested
power could increase social welfare through judicious manipulation of accounting rules,
we must recognize that Congress is not such a power. While remaining open to the
possibility of instrumental accounting, this Article concludes for now that social welfare
is probably maximized by minimizing consideration of non-accounting consequences in
the standard setting process.
18

See infra Part IV.
See infra Part V.
20
See infra Part V.C.1.
21
See infra Part V.C.3.
19
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The organization of this Article follows that of the introduction: Part I lays out
the theory of accounting from the efficient capital markets hypothesis to positive
accounting theory, with additional consideration of managerial agency theory. Part II
considers the empirical evidence related to the behavioral effects of accounting choice
and accounting standards. Part III synthesizes the theory and evidence and evaluates the
implications for cases like Kamin and managerial opposition to stock options expensing.
Part IV considers the implications of the behavioral effects of accounting on the book-tax
conformity debate, and Part V takes this analysis one step further, examining the
potential for instrumental use of accounting standards.
I. ACCOUNTING THEORY
All public companies prepare audited financial statements that are relied upon by
investors and others. The most important statements are the income statement, which
provides a summary of the company’s performance over the previous year or quarter, and
the balance sheet, which provides a snapshot view of the overall financial position of the
company as of the end of the period. The numbers that receive the greatest attention in
the financial press are the net profits or earnings figures from the income statement, often
portrayed as earnings per share of stock outstanding. The art of accounting, though, lies
in the detail, in determining how various transactions – purchases, sales, leases,
commitments to retirees, etc. – are to be accounted for. Accountants rely on a body of
rules known as generally accepted accounting principles, or GAAP. As the name
implies, many of these rules have not been mandated but have simply become accepted
by the accounting profession over time. Ultimately, however, the SEC is responsible for
maintaining the integrity of the securities markets and has delegated to the FASB the
power to promulgate mandatory and permissive rules of accounting practice as needed.
As a result, companies today face an array of mandatory rules as well as choices between
generally accepted treatments in preparing their financial statements.
Accounting theory seeks to explain how accounting standards affect share prices
and corporate behavior and how firms choose between permissible standards. Our
analysis begins with an exploration of the well-known efficient capital markets
hypothesis and the less-well-known (to legal academics, anyway) positive accounting
theory. These theories suggest that accounting matters not because stock valuation is
directly affected by accounting choices or standards but because contracts and regulatory
costs depend explicitly or implicitly on reported earnings and these arrangements are
sticky. Because of transaction costs, reported earnings can have an indirect effect on
share prices. Nonetheless, this Part goes on to argue that corporate decision makers have
additional incentives beyond share price maximization to prefer higher reported earnings.
Ultimately, the relationship between financial accounting and corporate behavior depends
on managerial agency costs as well as other transaction costs.
A. The Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis and the Capital Assets Pricing Model
Accounting and finance researchers generally believe that a change in accounting
standards or practices that increases or decreases reported earnings, but has no impact on
cash flow, transaction costs, or on the information provided to the marketplace, should
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have no effect on stock prices.22 Securities markets should see through such cosmetic
accounting adjustments to the underlying fundamentals that determine valuation. This
view follows directly from the efficient capital markets hypothesis (ECMH) and the
capital asset pricing model (CAPM).23
The CAPM simply assumes that the value of a company, and hence its stock
price, is a function of the cash flows and rates of return that are expected over time.24
There are three versions of the ECMH. The weak form holds that securities prices reflect
all information incorporated in past prices. The semi-strong form of the ECMH holds
that securities prices reflect all published information. The strong form holds that prices
reflect all discoverable information.25 If we limit our inquiry to changes in accounting
standards and choices that involve only the presentation of published information, we
need only accept the semi-strong version of the ECMH to conclude that accounting has
no direct effect on stock valuation.26 The evidence suggests, and most economists
believe, that markets are at least semi-strong efficient.27
Lynn Stout, Lawrence Cunningham, and others have argued that markets may not
be as efficient as economists generally presume,28 but I do not think that these criticisms
undermine the modest claim made above. Stout’s critique is primarily directed at
assertions of strong form market efficiency and an even stronger view called fundamental
value efficiency.29 The latter is the theory that prices not only reflect all available
22

See Thomas D. Fields et al, Empirical Research on Accounting Choice, 31 J. ACCT. & ECON.
255, 279-81 (2001) (noting that research in the 1970s supported market efficiency, and that researchers in
the 1980s and early 1990s assumed efficiency and looked for other explanations for why accounting would
matter, i.e., positive accounting theory. They note that some evidence produced in the 1990s is inconsistent
with efficient markets and investor rationality, but conclude that the evidence is insufficient to draw strong
inferences.)
Some accounting decisions, such as the choice between LIFO and FIFO inventory accounting,
affect a firm’s tax burden and after-tax cash flow. These accounting decisions would be expected to have
share price implications under this theory. See infra notes 151-153 and accompanying text.
23
See e.g., WATTS & ZIMMERMAN, supra note 13, at 72-73; Watts & Zimmerman, supra note 13,
at 131, 133 (discussing accounting irrelevance theory).
24
See WATTS & ZIMMERMAN, supra note 13, at 72-73.
25
See RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 351 (7th
ed. 2003).
26
For example, suppose firms ABC and XYZ are identical except for their accounting for an
expense of 10c per share. ABC reports earnings of $1.00 per share and discloses the 10c per share expense
in the footnotes to its accounting statements. XYZ subtracts the expense in its income statement reporting
earnings of 90c per share. Under the naïve investor view that runs counter to the semi-strong ECMH, XYZ
would trade for less than ABC. Suppose that the price to earnings ratio for firms in this industry with
prospects and risks similar to ABC and XYZ is 20. Under the naïve investor view, ABC would trade at
$20 per share, while XYZ would trade for $18 per share. Because the expense is fully disclosed in both
cases, the semi-strong version of the ECMH predicts that these firms would have an identical share price.
The market would treat each as earning 90c per share.
27
See BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 25, at 351-53. Evidence that earnings and dividend
announcements are almost fully incorporated into stock prices within five to ten minutes supports semistrong market efficiency. See id. at 353.
28
See Lynn A. Stout, The Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency: An Introduction to the New
Finance, 28 J. CORP. L. 635 (2003); Lawrence A. Cunningham, Behavioral Finance and Investor
Governance, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 767 (2002).
29
See Stout, supra note 28, at 637, 639 (describing the most common definition of an efficient
market as one that reflects all available information) and Part II, generally (critiquing the fundamental
value efficiency view).
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information but also provide the best estimate of the fundamental value of the underlying
asset.30 Fundamental value efficiency is quite hard to square with market corrections, so
these criticisms are well taken. But in considering the differential impact of competing
accounting standards or of accounting choices, we are not concerned with fundamental
equity values, only with the impact of accounting on stock prices relative to one another
or from one period to another. With regard to these issues, Stout argues that the cost of
arbitrage and of acquiring and processing information, particularly technical information,
undermines the efficiency with which information is impounded into prices.31
Although I agree with Stout’s criticisms as applied to strong form market
efficiency theory, and perhaps to some examples of semi-strong efficiency, I am skeptical
of her argument that accounting practices affect stock prices because of informational
inefficiency. As an example of an accounting practice that may affect prices if markets
are informationally inefficient, Stout mentions the debate over the treatment of
compensatory stock options.32 This debate centers on whether stock option expense
should be deducted from reported earnings in the body of the financial statement, as the
FASB will now require,33 or detailed in the footnotes to the accounting statement. It is
important to recognize, however, that this “footnote” provides exactly the same
information that will be provided in the body of company financial statements once the
new rule takes effect. Formerly, companies that did not “expense” options were required
to present pro forma income statements revealing the net income and earnings per share
figures that would have resulted had options been expensed.34 Thus, while I agree with
Stout that the cost of acquiring and processing information can limit market efficiency in
some circumstances, it is inconceivable to me that an income statement found on page
three of the financial statement is any more informative than the exact same statement
found on page thirty.
Of course, the stock option expensing example is the toughest case for those
arguing that accounting standards affect stock prices because of informational
inefficiencies. Other changes to accounting standards could have greater impact on the
information presented to investors. I think we can safely say, however, that a change in
standard that has no material effect on the information available to investors should have
no direct effect on stock prices.
Similarly, it is difficult to understand how the accounting issue presented in
Kamin could have any direct effect on the stock price of American Express. Recall that
the directors chose to distribute rather than sell depreciated securities the company was
holding as an investment.35 Sale of the securities would have provided a potential $8

30

See id. at 640.
See id. at 651-56 and studies cited therein. Stout also explores the effects of heterogeneous
investor expectations and investor irrationality on efficient market claims, but these limitations on
efficiency, if significant, pose less of a challenge to the semi-strong model. See id., Parts II and IV.
32
See id. at 657, n. 100.
33
See infra note 90 and accompanying text.
34
See Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 123, supra note 6, para. 45. Returning to
the example in note 26 supra, if the 10c per share expense related to compensatory stock options, the
footnoting option would allow ABC to report earnings of $1.00 per share in its income statement, but ABC
would be required to report pro forma earnings of 90c per share in the footnotes to its financial statements.
35
See Kamin, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 809.
31
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million tax benefit, but also would have reduced reported earnings by $26 million.36
Perhaps if the directors had been able to hide the investment loss from analysts by
distributing the securities, the impact on the price of American Express shares might have
been dampened. American Express stockholders, however, appeared to have been well
aware of the economic loss that had been suffered. The company had announced that the
depreciated securities would be distributed in kind as a special dividend, and apparently
the company had provided enough information for some of the shareholders to realize
that this action would result in the company foregoing a sizeable tax benefit. Ultimately,
the board held a special meeting to reconsider distribution versus sale. Can there be any
doubt at this point that the economic loss suffered had been fully incorporated in the
stock price of American Express and that the additional step of reducing corporate
earnings by the amount of the loss would have provided no new information to the
market?
There can be no real doubt. Nonetheless, Lawrence Cunningham argues that the
American Express directors still may have outsmarted the market by distributing the
securities, and that their action reflected healthy skepticism about market efficiency.37
The thrust of his and similar arguments is that investor cognitive biases, including loss
aversion (the tendency to place greater importance on losses than gains), overconfidence
(the belief that we are all better than average drivers, stock pickers, etc.), and availability
(the tendency to place greater weight on more recent events) undermine the efficiency of
the capital markets.38 However, Cunningham does not explain which cognitive bias
would cause “market participants [to] focus on the income statement and earnings per
share rather than on the balance sheet and owner’s equity,”39 and it is not obvious which,
if any, cognitive bias would be at work here. Perhaps some investors overconfidently
rely on raw earnings numbers or rely excessively on reported earnings and discount
footnotes and balance sheets because the former are more salient, but this sounds less like
bias and more like laziness. More generally, while there is evidence that market
participants suffer from cognitive biases, it is not clear that these biases affect market
prices.40
B. Positive Accounting Theory
A believer in the semi-strong view of the ECMH might be tempted to conclude
from the foregoing discussion that accounting standards and accounting choices are
irrelevant, and this irrelevancy view held sway in the academic community for many
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See id. at 809-10.
See Cunningham, supra note 28, at 823-24.
38
See id. at 775 and 783. See also BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 25, at 358-59. As Stout notes
the behavioral finance field has experienced explosive growth. I cite Cunningham as one example since he
has specifically referenced the Kamin case, but many others could be cited. See Stout, supra note 28, at
660, n. 115-117.
39
Cunningham, supra note 28, at 823-24.
40
See BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 25, at 358-360 (questioning behavioral finance explanations
for market anomalies and noting, inter alia, that financial institutions employ behavioral finance experts to
assist them in overcoming these biases).
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years.41 However, researchers investigating company choices among acceptable
accounting alternatives found enough systematic variation to doubt the irrelevancy theory
and seek alternative explanations. For example, firm size and leverage (the ratio of
corporate debt to equity) both appear to be associated with accounting choice, a result at
odds with an irrelevancy view of accounting.42 Findings such as these have led
researchers to search for indirect effects of accounting on share value, a field known as
positive accounting theory.43
The ECMH only says that the securities markets see through cosmetic accounting
changes. This does not necessarily mean that reported earnings are irrelevant. Many
corporate contracts are tied to reported earnings, including debt covenants and executive
compensation agreements.44 Renegotiating these contracts to adjust for accounting
changes can be costly, while failure to renegotiate in face of a purely accounting-driven
change in earnings can be costly as well.45 In addition, if an accounting-driven increase
in reported earnings is difficult to distinguish from an increase in profits arising from
business fundamentals, the earnings bump could have political ramifications, such as
increased exposure to tax hikes or reduced subsidies.46 Finally, mandatory accounting
changes that reduce corporate freedom to select optimal accounting techniques could
reduce the value of financial statements for private contracting.47 All of these indirect
effects of reported earnings on share value are referred to in the positive accounting
theory literature as contracting costs.
Transaction costs resulting from sticky contracts and political costs resulting from
an apparent surge in profits affect a company’s cash flows. Thus, this explanation is
perfectly consistent with the ECMH and CAPM. In developing the accounting
irrelevance theory it had been assumed that accounting standards and practices did not
affect transaction costs. The advance made by positive accounting theorists has been to
eliminate this simplifying assumption and begin to explain the relevance of accounting to
share price.48
Consider the impact of accounting on corporate debt covenants. These covenants
are based on GAAP accounting, which means that they are tied to reported earnings, and
41

See Holthausen & Leftwich, supra note 14, at 80 (discussing early tests finding no stock price
reaction to changes in accounting techniques except for changes affecting taxes); Watts & Zimmerman,
supra note 13, at 133.
42
See Holthausen & Leftwich, supra note 14, at 79.
43
See Watts & Zimmerman, supra note 13.
44
See id. at 133. See also Holthausen & Leftwich, supra note 14, at 84-88.
45
See WATTS & ZIMMERMAN, supra note 13, at 215.
46
See id. at 222-23.
47
See id. at 219; Daniel W. Collins et al, The Economic Determinants of the Market Reaction to
Proposed Mandatory Accounting Changes in the Oil and Gas Industry: A Cross-Sectional Analysis, 3 J.
ACCT. & ECON. 37, 43 (1981). In addition, a change in accounting standard may affect the reliability of
information provided to the markets. New standards that reduce reliability would have a negative effect on
firm value by increasing contracting costs generally. See Hassan Espahbodi et al, Impact on Equity Prices
of Pronouncements Related to Nonpension Postretirement Benefits, 14 J. ACCT. & ECON. 323, 327 (1991).
48
There is an obvious analogy between the evolution of positive accounting theory and positive
finance theory. Miller and Modigliani demonstrated in 1961 that corporate financing decisions, such as
dividend payout policies, are irrelevant in the absence of transaction costs. See M. H. Miller & F.
Modigliani, Dividend Policy, Growth and the Valuation of Shares, 34 J. BUS. 411 (1961). Subsequent
researchers demonstrated that taxes, agency costs, and other imperfections in the market render corporate
finance relevant. See BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 25, ch 16.
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they usually are based on “rolling” GAAP, that is, GAAP in effect at the time of
calculation.49 Renegotiation of debt covenants can be difficult and costly, particularly
covenants associated with publicly held debt which generally require a two-thirds vote of
the outstanding debt for amendment.50 Violation of debt covenants can be costly as well,
resulting in restrictions on the payment of dividends, limitations on merger activity, and
other adverse consequences.51 Thus, an accounting choice, an operational decision, or a
mandatory change in accounting standards that reduces earnings, even if the earnings
reduction is completely cosmetic, reduces firm value by increasing the risk of costly debt
covenant violation. As Richard Leftwich points out, reduction in firm value should not
exceed the lesser of the cost of renegotiating the covenants, redeeming the debt (if
possible), default, or adjusting operations to avoid default.52 Unless renegotiation is
costless, however, an income-reducing accounting change will reduce the value of a firm
with outstanding debt to some extent.
However, the various contracting costs that have been identified do not all run in
the same direction. There are various stories about the effect of accounting and earnings
changes on regulation. Watts and Zimmerman postulate that firms would wish to keep
reported earnings low to stave off tax increases, suggesting that income-reducing
standard changes or accounting choices would reduce political costs.53 If renegotiation of
executive compensation agreements is costly, mandatory accounting changes that reduce
reported earnings will be resisted by management, but the effect on firm value is
ambiguous. At one level reducing reported earnings in an environment of sticky
compensation contracts should increase firm value by reducing compensation payments.
On the other hand, reducing incentive compensation could adversely affect firm value.
The optimal contracting story has no directional prediction. Under this theory,
mandatory standard changes that reduce accounting choices reduce firm value whether
the new standard results in higher or lower reported earnings.54
C. Shareholder and Manager Appetite for Earnings
In the absence of transaction costs, cosmetic accounting changes would have no
impact on share value, and loyal directors would simply ignore the impact of their
decisions on reported earnings. The decision to sacrifice cash flow for earnings, as in
Kamin, would clearly run counter to shareholder interests. Once we introduce positive
accounting theory, however, the picture is more complex. Assuming that contracting
costs are non-trivial, loyal managers would need to balance earnings effects against other
cash flow effects, and even cosmetic changes in accounting could affect share value.
Let’s assume that debt covenant costs dominate other contracting costs so that a
reduction in reported earnings resulting from operational decisions or a mandatory
49

See Richard Leftwich, Evidence of the Impact of Mandatory Changes in Accounting Principles
on Corporate Loan Agreements, 3 J. ACCT. & ECON. 3, 6 (1981).
50
See id. at 8.
51
See id. at 6.
52
See id. at 7.
53
See WATTS & ZIMMERMAN, supra note 13, at 231. Cf. Simon Romero & Edmund L. Andrews,
At Exxon Mobil, a Record Profit but No Fanfare, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2006) (covering Exxon Mobil’s
announcement of a record $36 billion in annual profits and efforts by the company to play down the news).
54
See WATTS & ZIMMERMAN, supra note 13, at 219.
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change in accounting standards reduces firm value. Share value maximization would
require managers to take these costs into account. But there are conflicting forces. As in
Kamin, steps taken to increase reported earnings often result in increased taxes, and vice
versa. A proposed change in accounting standards may decrease reported earnings and
increase the expected cost of default on debt covenants, but opposing the change may
entail monetary and perhaps political costs. Thus, while shareholders will have some
appetite for accounting-induced increases in reported earnings, this appetite will be
tempered by other costs. Share value will be maximized by maximizing after-tax cash
flow, but this requires striking a balance between the contracting costs associated with
reported earnings and other cash flow effects. The optimal point on the continuum
between earnings maximization and maximization of other cash flows will depend on
firm characteristics. For example, firms that are highly leveraged will face relatively
greater costs from reduced reported earnings. Of course, even calculating the optimal
point along this continuum is costly, and for some firms share value may indeed be
maximized by simply ignoring the effect of reported earnings (perhaps the case for
unleveraged companies) or by maximizing reported earnings and ignoring cash flow
(unlikely, but conceivably the case for highly leveraged firms in the vicinity of
insolvency).
In a world without agency costs, managers’ appetite for reported earnings would
mirror that of shareholders, but in the real world, we should expect managers to have a
stronger appetite for earnings than shareholders. First, and most obviously, managerial
compensation may depend on reported earnings, independent of the effect of earnings on
share price. Accounting-based bonuses have a long pedigree and remain common
today.55 Reported earnings often factor into managerial bonuses both as an element in
bonus calculations and as a ceiling on bonus payouts.56 In recent years, of course, equitybased compensation has grown to overshadow traditional bonuses (although accountingbased bonuses generally have not been reduced, much to the consternation of corporate
pay critics).57 However, the latest trend is to tie receipt of equity-based pay to accounting
performance, increasing the sensitivity of managerial compensation to financial
accounting. Thirty percent of major U.S. corporations recently surveyed by Mercer
Consulting based a portion of CEO equity compensation on the achievement of
accounting-based performance targets.58 For example, stock option grants increasingly

See Susan Eichen & Eric Scoones, Annual Incentive Plan Design Considerations, in EXECUTIVE
COMPENSATION 35, 37, 49-50 (Yale D. Tauber & Donald R. Levy eds., 2002) (noting that “vast majority”
of U.S. companies maintain annual incentive plans and that financial measures of performance, principally
income-based measures, are among the most commonly used metrics in these plans).
56
See JEROLD L. ZIMMERMAN, ACCOUNTING FOR DECISION MAKING AND CONTROL 185 (1995).
57
According to a recent study, equity-based compensation accounted for 72% of total
compensation paid to the top five executives of S&P 500 companies in 2000 and 2001, and then declined to
55% of total compensation for 2003, the last year of data reported. This study also found that although
average equity-based pay received by CEOs of S&P 500, Mid-Cap 500, and Small-Cap 600 companies
about tripled between 1993 and 2003, cash compensation still increased by about 40% across this period.
See Lucian Bebchuk & Yaniv Grinstein, The Growth of Executive Pay, 21 OXFORD REV. ECON. POLICY
283, 290-92 (2005).
58
See Joann S. Lublin, Boards Tie CEO Pay More Tightly to Performance; Options Grants May
Depend on Meeting Financial Goals: Moving Beyond a “Pulse”, WALL ST. J., Feb. 21, 2006, at A1.
55
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are made contingent on a corporation’s achievement of earnings, revenue growth, or
other financial targets.59
In addition, high reported income may have an indirect effect on a manager’s
compensation. Even if information presentation has no direct effect on stock prices and
little or no direct effect on compensation, managers may be able to use high reported
earnings as a factor in negotiating additional compensation. Compensation consultants
working for senior executives are masters at identifying the metrics that allow their
bosses to report better than average performance, justifying higher than average
compensation.60 Artificially inflating reported earnings is one way to shine relative to
one’s peers.
Positive accounting theorists have long recognized that managers of firms with
earnings-based bonuses will tend to choose earnings-increasing accounting practices and
favor earnings-increasing standards.61 The more general point that even executives of
companies that lack explicit earnings-based bonuses will share these motivations has not
been widely recognized in the accounting literature, perhaps because it is a difficult
proposition to test. However, it is important to recognize the difference between this
story and the contracting and political cost stories. Assuming that accounting-induced
increases in executive compensation do not provide commensurate increases in
productivity, an earnings-increasing change in accounting standards or practices tends to
reduce share value because of the increased compensation payout. But despite the
reduction in share value, the executive decision makers may very well favor the change
because they receive a portion of the increased compensation that results. Here there is a
divergence of interests between managers and shareholders that does not arise in
examining the impact of reported earnings on debt contracts or political costs. This is still
a transaction cost story, but in the agency cost vein.62
Second, in some cases, managers may care less about the compensatory effects of
reported earnings per se, and more about the increased exposure to scrutiny of certain
elements of their compensation. The FASB’s decision to require companies to shift stock
option expense reporting from footnote to front page will reduce reported earnings and
thus will reduce earnings-based bonuses and could have negative effects on other forms
of compensation. But perhaps more importantly, the new reporting requirement makes
option compensation more visible to corporate critics and shareholder advocates, which
may result in pressure on directors to limit options.63 Thus, resistance to stock option
expensing may appear to reflect a stronger managerial appetite for earnings than truly
exists.
59

See id.
See GRAEF S. CRYSTAL, IN SEARCH OF EXCESS 42-50 (1991); LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED,
PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE 71 (2004); Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al, Managerial Power and Rent
Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 790-91 (2002).
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See Watts & Zimmerman, supra note 13, at 138; WATTS & ZIMMERMAN, supra note 13, at 256.
62
See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976) (seminal article on the
manager/shareholder agency problem).
63
See Dechow et al, supra note 9, discussed infra Part II.C. (empirical study indicating that
managerial resistance to stock option expensing proposal was driven by concerns relating to the scrutiny of
option compensation), Bebchuk et al, supra note 60 (developing a managerial power model of executive
compensation and arguing that salience is a critical factor limiting compensation). For further discussion,
see infra notes 106-111 and accompanying text.
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Third, some managers may hold an honest, but mistaken belief that information
presentation directly affects stock prices. They may subscribe to the naïve investor view
of the market that runs counter to the semi-strong version of the ECMH, and holds that
investors take earnings at face value and reward firms that report high earnings with high
share prices. Obviously, managers that honestly thought that reported earnings directly
affected their stock price would place a high value on increasing those earnings.
Fourth, managers may be socialized into placing inordinate importance on
earnings, achieving earnings targets, and maintaining steady earnings improvements by
the focus of stock analysts on these metrics. Of course, all else being equal, higher
earnings should translate into a higher stock price. One can easily imagine, however, that
over time high earnings could become a goal in and of itself.
There are no obvious reasons why managers would have less of an appetite for
earnings than shareholders, or at least no systematic reasons.64 At times, accounting
results may provide an excuse or cover for managers to achieve other objectives, and
excuses may be predicated on earnings-decreasing changes in accounting. For example,
a 1990 change in accounting for post-retirement health care benefits resulted in a
substantial increase in reported expenses.65 The implementation of this change was
followed by massive cuts in these benefits. The accounting change may have provided
the political cover needed to implement these cuts. However, this Machiavellian story is
undermined by the observation that managers vociferously opposed the adoption of this
accounting standard.66 Moreover, the excuse theory works both ways. As noted above,
managerial resistance to stock option expensing, an earnings-decreasing change, may
have arisen in part from a desire to minimize the salience of managerial compensation.
Given the directional ambiguity of the accounting-as-excuse story and all the
other reasons for managers to have a stronger appetite for earnings than shareholders, we
should expect the distribution of managerial preferences along the continuum between
maximizing reported earnings and maximizing other cash flows to be skewed in the
direction of earnings maximization, relative to shareholder preferences. Assuming a
divergence between shareholder and manager preferences, how do firms respond in
situations in which earnings and cash flow concerns conflict? The resolution depends on
the severity of the managerial agency problem in any given firm, which is a function of
incentives and corporate governance.67 Perversely, managers of firms that have more
64

Depending on bonus plan structure, managers may have an incentive to reduce reported
earnings in a particular period. Imagine that a manager’s annual bonus opportunity is dependent on
company earnings exceeding a particular threshold and that it becomes obvious that the threshold will not
be exceeded for year X. In that case, the manager has an incentive to accelerate expenses from year X+1 to
year X. Taking a “big bath” in year X will have no impact on her bonus for that year, but will increase the
likelihood of exceeding the earnings threshold and receiving a bonus for year X+1. See, e.g., Timothy W.
Koch & Larry D. Wall, The Use of Accruals to Manage Reported Earnings: Theory and Evidence (Federal
Reserve Bank of Atlanta Working Paper, Nov. 2000). Note, however, that the “big bath” phenomenon
does not suggest that managers would prefer earnings-reducing accounting standard changes. On balance,
managers prefer to report high earnings.
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See infra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
66
See Stephen A. Zeff, The Evolution of U.S. GAAP: The Political Forces Behind the Professional
Standards, THE CPA J., Feb. 2005, at 25-26 (recounting strong opposition by industry to this change in
accounting standards but noting that “afterwards, companies conceded its constructive effect on their
decision making.”).
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See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 62; Bebchuk et al, supra note 62.
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closely linked executive pay to earnings in order to align managerial incentives with
those of shareholders are more likely to sacrifice cash flow for reported earnings.68 But
among firms with similar pay practices, we should expect better governed firms to more
closely track shareholder preferences and exhibit relatively less appetite for earnings
relative to more poorly governed firms. In fact, one can imagine that in many cases
shareholder preferences for earnings per se are negligible, while managerial preferences
are considerable, leading to quite different earnings management behavior between well
and poorly governed firms. I am not aware of any empirical evidence on this point, and it
seems fertile ground for further research. We turn now, however, to consider empirical
evidence on the general topic of the behavioral impact of financial accounting.
II. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON ACCOUNTING, SHARE VALUE, AND CORPORATE BEHAVIOR
Positive accounting theory provides a rational basis for believing that accounting
standards and practices matter, and the empirical evidence generally supports this view.
Managers and corporations act as if accounting mattered, and we observe that accounting
choices vary systematically between firms. Unfortunately, the empirical evidence
supporting details of positive accounting theory is mixed, at best. Evidence of stock price
reaction to accounting changes has been found in some studies, but a recent survey of the
empirical literature concludes that this evidence is not strong. Managerial and corporate
reaction to accounting changes provides stronger evidence of positive accounting theory.
Much of this evidence, however, is as consistent with a manager-driven theory of
accounting choice as it is with positive accounting theory. None of the evidence is
inconsistent with the semi-strong view of the ECMH.
A. Stock Price Reaction to Changes in Mandatory Accounting Standards
If one is looking for real world effects of accounting, the most obvious place to
start is with changes in mandatory standards and market reaction to those changes.
Indeed, some studies have found stock price reactions to changes in mandatory
accounting standards. For example, in 1990 FASB implemented Statement of Financial
Accounting Standards No. 106 (SFAS 106), which replaced pay-as-you-go accounting
for post-retirement health care benefits with accrual accounting.69 This shift reduced
reported earnings for companies offering such benefits. One study of SFAS 106
implementation found that the release of the exposure draft document formally proposing
the standard change resulted in a 3% share price drop for the firms in their sample.70 This
result appears to provide evidence for the contracting cost hypothesis, and specifically the
68

This phenomenon demonstrates the intractability of the managerial agency problem. As with
the arcade game “Whac-a-Mole,” efforts to combat shirking, excessive perquisite consumption and similar
agency problems by tying executive pay to financial results can result in unexpected agency problems
popping up elsewhere.
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See Espahbodi et al, supra note 47.
70
See id. at 324, 341. Sample firms offering post-retirement benefits experienced a 3% abnormal
negative return compared to a control group of firms not offering such benefits. The authors also found
that the negative impact of the new standard on stock prices varied cross-sectionally as expected; e.g., the
effect was more pronounced for firms that were at greater risk of default as evidenced by high debt to
equity ratios.
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debt covenant hypothesis: Reduced earnings as a result of SFAS 106 implementation
would increase the risk of costly default.71
By contrast, a study of share price reaction to several key FASB announcements
pertaining to stock option expensing found no evidence of systematic market reaction to
these announcements.72 Expensing of stock options would reduce reported earnings and
result in a stock price decrease if the debt covenant effect were dominant. Thus,
announcements signaling an increasing/decreasing likelihood of expensing should have
resulted in reduced/increased share prices.
In their 1986 book on positive accounting theory, Watts and Zimmerman report
that studies investigating stock price reactions to mandated changes in accounting
procedures support the theory, but they admit that the associations between variables are
inconsistent across studies.73 A more recent survey article reviewing twenty six studies
of mandated accounted changes published in the top three accounting journals during the
1980s, concluded that in aggregate these studies provided little or no evidence of stock
price effects. The author concluded that the effects were small.74 It is also possible,
however, that the effects are significant, but difficult to detect because accounting
standard changes are not announced out of the blue.
Watts and Zimmerman note that stock price change studies are relatively weak
tests of positive accounting theory.75 The weakness arises in part because of the
difficulty of isolating accounting change announcements that surprise the market.76 If
one accepts at least the semi-strong version of the ECMH, the actual reporting of higher
or lower earnings as a result of a change in accounting standard should have no effect on
stock prices. 77 The market sees through this. The effect on firm value and stock price
arises from sticky contracts and the effect of a change in reported earnings on those
contracts. Once the market gets wind of a coming change in standards, however, the
market can predict the impact of that change on contracting costs in advance of its
implementation. Thus, assuming that a standard change is merely cosmetic and has no
effect on the information available to the marketplace, the impact of the coming change
should be fully incorporated in stock prices when the market is confident that the change
71

See id. The authors also speculated that SFAS 106 may have increased contracting costs
generally, by making a poor tradeoff between timeliness and reliability of information provided to the
marketplace. Accrual accounting is more timely than pay-as-you-go, but accrual accounting involves
estimation that was not necessary under the former standard. See id. at 327.
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See WATTS & ZIMMERMAN, supra note 13, at 311.
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See Leftwich, supra note 49, at 9-10.
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were to make public previously non-public material information, the post-change earnings reports would be
informative and would affect stock prices.
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will be implemented. As a result, researchers looking for evidence of market reaction to
accounting changes focus on FASB exposure drafts or other announcements of proposed
changes. But a price effect would be expected only when the market is surprised.
Accounting standard changes that are suggested, debated, announced, revised and reannounced may not result in the degree of surprise that would result in a statistically
significant stock price change even if the contracting cost story is right.78
It is worth noting, however, that there is no evidence that the implementation of
an accounting standard change impacts stock prices. Researchers investigating SFAS
106 implementation, for example, generally agree that the market had fully incorporated
the change into stock prices prior to implementation.79 This evidence is consistent with
semi-strong market efficiency. Under a naïve investor view of the market, stock prices
should have been reduced on the promulgation of earnings statements applying the new
standard.
B. Corporate Response to Changes in Mandatory Accounting Standards
Given the difficulty of isolating price responses to accounting standard changes,
some studies have focused instead on corporate reaction to these changes. These studies
reinforce the view that accounting matters and provide limited support for the positive
accounting theory explanation.
For example, SFAS 106, which engineered the switch from pay-as-you-go
accounting for post-retirement health care benefits to accrual accounting, had a dramatic
effect on firm behavior.80 Companies reacted to the new standard by slashing postretirement health care benefits. One study of SFAS 106 implementation found a tight
cluster of benefit cuts around the adoption date following 10 years in which cuts were
rare,81 and concluded that the “data indicate a strong associative relation between the
decision to cut retiree health care benefits and the requirement to adopt SFAS No. 106.”82
The authors of this study also found evidence supportive of the contracting cost
hypothesis. They found that cuts in benefits were related to the extent to which a firm
was leveraged prior to adoption of SFAS 106 (a proxy for the tightness of debt
covenants) and the extent to which adoption increased that leverage (which proxied for
the increased risk of covenant violation).83

78

See Holthausen & Leftwich, supra note 14, at 105.
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However, as suggested above, some observers believe that the relationship
between the promulgation of SFAS 106 and benefit cuts is better explained as political
cover.84 Accrual accounting for these benefits massively increased the expense reported
in company financial statements and allowed companies slashing benefits to place the
blame on the accountants.85 Thus, it is difficult to determine the relative contributions of
contracting costs, political cover, and managerial fixation with reported earnings towards
the clear corporate behavioral response to SFAS 106.
Similar results were found in an earlier study that investigated corporate response
to SFAS 13, which moved capital lease disclosures from financial statement footnotes
onto corporate balance sheets.86 This move had the effect of increasing debt and
reducing reported income, increasing leverage and decreasing reported rates of return.87
From either a contracting cost or managerial compensation perspective, this was an
unwelcome change. Increased leverage increased the risk of debt covenant default, and
managerial compensation often is tied, implicitly or explicitly, to accounting rates of
return.88 Thus, the authors predicted (and found) that firms would respond by reducing
their reliance on capital leases and shifting to operating leases that had better accounting
characteristics.89 Although the authors demonstrated corporate sensitivity to the negative
accounting standard change, they did not test for the positive accounting theory
explanations.
C. Stock Option Expense Accounting
Of course, the highest profile change in accounting standards to occur in some
time was the adoption of mandatory stock option expensing, which is coming into effect
in 2005 and 2006.90 Many experts predict that this change will result in a significant
adjustment in compensation practices, although it is much too early to say. A study of
corporate lobbying against the rule’s adoption, however, indicates that opposition was
driven by management concerns unrelated to real economic effects.91 Before turning to
this study, however, let us consider another behavioral aspect of the stock option story.
As noted above, until 2005 standard compensatory stock options resulted in no reduction
in reported earnings, ever, although the compensation expense has been reported in
footnotes to earnings statements since 1995. Anecdotal and empirical evidence suggests
that this anomalous accounting treatment was a primary factor in the growing use of
options in the 1990s. Less clear, however, is whether positive accounting theory or self-
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serving managerial behavior better explains the incentive effect of stock options
accounting.
Practitioners and practice-oriented academics are uniformly of the view that the
accounting treatment of stock options is important to executives and has contributed to
the explosion in their use. Kevin Murphy, a financial economist and noted executive
compensation expert, argues that the increasing prevalence in the 1990s of broad-based
stock option plans granting a majority of options to employees below the very top ranks
is evidence of option overuse, since only the top executives are in position to
significantly influence the firm’s stock price.92 Murphy attributes excessive use of
options to management misperception that options represent inexpensive compensation.93
That misperception is based on the fact that options require no cash outlay (although this
is also true of stock compensation, which is far less prevalent) and on the fact that, until
recently, options did not reduce reported earnings.94 Murphy does not believe that the
accounting treatment of options has a direct effect on share prices or that management
fixation on compensation accounting is based solely on share price effects.95 “[B]ased on
countless discussions (often heated arguments) with compensation consultants,
practitioners, and executives, [Murphy] is convinced that … this fixation reflects more
than the effect of accounting rules on stock prices.”96
Murphy believes that “companies would respond … dramatically to changes in
the accounting treatment of stock options.”97 As evidence, Murphy cites data
demonstrating that the practice of explicitly reducing the exercise prices of outstanding
stock options following market downturns came to an abrupt halt at the end of 1998 when
new accounting rules required firms to expense repriced options.98
Similarly, Brian Hall and Jeff Liebman echo the view of practitioners that
accounting treatment is an important factor in option plan design.99 They report that
companies often fail to seriously consider stock option plans that have “bad accounting,”
i.e., result in compensation expense recognition.100
Although somewhat mixed, there is a growing body of empirical evidence linking
stock option use to its favorable accounting treatment. Because the accounting treatment
of conventional stock options was consistent up to 2005, cross sectional analyses have
been employed seeking to establish a relationship between option use and the degree to
which companies are concerned with financial reporting results. Sensitivity to reported
earnings sometimes is estimated directly by looking at variables such as interest coverage
or retained earnings. Low interest coverage increases the probability of violating debt
covenants and limited retained earnings are likely to result in dividend constraints. These
92
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variables are consistent with positive accounting theory and specifically the contracting
cost theory. Other studies determine earnings sensitivity indirectly by looking for other
evidence of earnings management, such as how consistently a firm beats analyst earnings
forecasts. Although these latter studies tell us something about earnings sensitivity, they
tell us little about positive accounting theory. Earnings sensitivity in these cases could be
driven by self-serving managerial behavior rather than contracting costs.
Of three studies focusing exclusively on option grants to CEOs, only one found
significant evidence that accounting drives option use.101 However, two studies of broadbased option plans both support the view that accounting drives option use, as well as the
contracting cost explanation. First, an analysis of all options granted to employees by
123 firms over an eleven year period found a positive relationship between the use of
options and other earnings management techniques and between option use and dividend
constraints.102 And a more recent examination of option grants to executives reported in
the Standard and Poor’s ExecuComp database yielded the conclusion “that what is
driving the use of options in non-CEO compensation is not the need to realign incentives,
but the desire to avoid the expense.”103
Although CEOs typically receive the largest option grants within their companies,
CEO options typically represent a small percentage of total options granted.104
Accordingly, the earnings effect of CEO options alone would be small in comparison to
the effect of paying employees with options generally, and it is not surprising that studies
looking at broad-based option plans are more informative. Of course, the ultimate test of
the importance of option accounting to option use will be in the response of companies to
the new option expensing requirement. Already, there is anecdotal evidence of a shift
away from options in favor of other forms of equity compensation, such as restricted
stock, but it is too early to draw firm conclusions.105
The evidence suggests that the pre-2005 stock option accounting rules served as a
successful, although unintended, accounting incentive. Even if one accepts this
conclusion, however, one can ask whether we can generalize from this. There is some
evidence consistent with a positive accounting theory explanation for accounting-driven
option use, but other evidence simply indicates that accounting matters, without really
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telling us why. Moreover, there is an additional reason to suspect that self-serving
managerial behavior played an important role in the use of options under the pre-2005
accounting regime. Managers may care excessively about reported earnings generally,
but even if they do not, they might prefer that stock options not be expensed (and might
over-rely on options given the pre-2005 accounting treatment), because “footnoting”
option compensation helped to camouflage their own compensation.
Two colleagues and I have argued that U.S. executive compensation practices
reflect in large part a managerial power view of corporate governance.106 Under this
theory, executive compensation is not set by efficient contracting, but is largely
controlled by the managers themselves, subject to market forces and to investor and
financial press outrage that tends to constrain directors and the managers themselves.107
Under this theory, compensation transparency is the manager’s enemy, and compensation
channels that are less visible or camouflaged will be preferred.108
There is some evidence that accounting camouflage plays a role in stock option
use. Although options are often granted far down into the employee ranks, the value of
options often is concentrated at the very top. One study found evidence that corporate
opposition to the 1993 FASB proposal to mandate stock option expensing was driven by
top executives’ concerns relating to the scrutiny of their compensation and not by real
economic effects.109 Specifically, the study found that top executives of companies
submitting comment letters to the FASB opposing the change tended to receive a greater
fraction of their total pay through options and more pay in total than executives of similar
non-commenting firms.110 In addition, it found that option programs were more “top
heavy” in commenting firms relative to their non-commenting peers.111 This evidence
suggests that the stock option accounting “incentive” may have been more effective than
simple earnings fixation would suggest.
D. Voluntary Accounting Choice Evidence - Tax/Earnings Tradeoffs
Every day, managers make choices between permissible accounting techniques
and make operational decisions that have significant accounting consequences. The
choice to employ stock options in lieu of other forms of compensation provides one
example of voluntary accounting choice writ large. Studies of voluntary accounting
choices demonstrate that accounting is not irrelevant. This literature is voluminous.
Instead of attempting to provide an overview, I will direct the reader to any of several
good survey articles noted in the margin,112 and focus here, by way of example, on the
literature examining company tradeoffs between minimizing taxes and boosting reported
earnings. This literature is typical of voluntary accounting choice studies, demonstrates
accounting relevance, and provides some evidence of positive accounting theory.
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Although financial and tax accounting rules differ in many respects, managers
often face a conflict between minimizing taxes and maximizing earnings. Actions that
reduce taxable income and taxes often result in lower financial statement income as well.
If accounting were irrelevant, we would expect managers to ignore reported earnings and
minimize taxes in order to maximize after tax cash flow. Instead, we often see managers
sacrificing cash flow for reported earnings improvements.
The Kamin case, discussed above, is a prime anecdotal example of this effect.
There, recall, the directors apparently forewent potential tax savings of $8 million to
avoid a $26 million reduction in reported earnings.113 The decision to distribute the
depreciated securities to the shareholders rather than sell them and distribute the cash
proceeds in Kamin apparently had no other consequence.
We should be careful not to read too much into this example. First, the case was
decided on a summary judgment motion made by the American Express defendants,
which required the judge to accept the facts as presented by the plaintiffs. Normally, we
should be highly suspicious of the facts presented in this circumstance. However, the
opinion suggests that minutes of the relevant directors’ meeting essentially confirmed the
facts alleged by the plaintiffs.114 Second, this is a single isolated case. Nonetheless,
practitioners generally are not surprised by the action of the American Express board in
this case and find it consistent with their experience.115 It is also consistent with
empirical studies of asset divestitures, as discussed below.
If the facts are taken as given in the opinion, the Kamin case squarely presents a
tradeoff between tax savings and earnings management. Although somewhat less clean,
two empirical studies of asset divestitures support the view that managers sacrifice tax
benefits and cash flow to boost earnings when disposing of assets, but provide only
limited support for positive accounting theory. One study investigated taxable sales
versus non-taxable spin-offs of corporate subsidiaries.116 Just as the American Express
directors faced a choice between selling the depreciated securities and distributing them
to shareholders, directors of a company wishing to dispose of a subsidiary can sell it or
distribute its stock to shareholders through a spin-off. If managers focused solely on tax
minimization, they would spin-off subsidiaries if a sale would result in a taxable gain and
sell subsidiaries if a sale would result in a tax loss. Instead, this study demonstrated that
managers routinely incurred avoidable tax costs or forwent potential tax benefits in
structuring divestments.117 Of course, there could be many reasons other than tax and
financial reporting considerations for structuring a divestment as a sale or spin-off – a
sale generates cash, while a spin-off does not; a sale may yield a premium price if the
asset is worth more in the hands of the buyer. Nonetheless, the evidence was consistent
with the view that managers trade off tax against earnings, and the authors estimated that
firms were willing to incur $0.19 of extra tax costs to boost earnings by $1.118 This study
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provided little evidence of positive accounting theory. The results were only “weakly
consistent” with a contracting cost variables.119
Another study of major asset divestitures confirms that managers weigh both
taxes and the impact on reported income in making divestitures.120 This study finds that
firms with greater inside ownership concentration are less likely to sacrifice tax benefits
in an effort to boost reported earnings.121 The author suggests that high inside ownership
concentration reduces capital market pressures on a firm. That may be so, but it is
unclear how this reduced capital market pressure fits into positive accounting theory.
That theory holds that shareholders are sensitive to earnings because of sticky contracts
based on those earnings. Perhaps high inside ownership concentration reduces the cost of
renegotiating executive compensation contracts, but it is unclear what effect inside
ownership would have on debt covenants, which most researchers consider the dominant
factor. It seems much more plausible that firms with high inside ownership focus more
on after-tax cash flow, because manager and shareholder interests are more closely
aligned. This evidence supports the view that the appetite for earnings found in many of
these studies is driven by manager preferences in lieu of or in addition to shareholder
preferences consistent with positive accounting theory.
Kamin and the asset disposition studies certainly demonstrate management
sensitivity to reported earnings. But these cases involve discrete, one time events, and
questions of investment, disposition, or payout policy, not day-to-day operations. One
may question whether earnings effects influence corporate behavior with respect to more
day-to-day operational decisions.
A number of studies have evaluated how firms trade off tax minimization against
financial reporting considerations with respect to routine, day-to-day activities. One
review study summed up the evidence as follows: “In short, the literature suggests that
financial accounting management and tax management are not independent and neither
consideration consistently dominates the other in decision-making.”122 In other words, to
a greater or lesser extent, managers trade off taxes for earnings. Again, rather than
reviewing a large sample of such studies, I will focus on just one example involving
disqualification of incentive stock options (ISOs) and leave the interested reader to peruse
the review studies cited in the notes.123 The ISO disqualification evidence is consistent
with what we have seen before – accounting matters, but evidence supporting positive
accounting theory explanations of accounting relevance is mixed.
Compared with nonqualified stock options, ISOs provide tax benefits for
optionees, but result in tax costs for issuers.124 In some cases, depending on various tax
rates and the amount of appreciation in the stock underlying the ISO, it makes economic
sense for companies and employees to agree to arrange dispositions that will disqualify
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options for ISO treatment.125 At times the tax benefit to a company from disqualification
is more than sufficient to reimburse an employee for her additional tax cost. This
reimbursement, however, must be recognized as an expense, which reduces reported
income.126
Matsunaga, Shevlin, and Shores investigated ISO exercise and disqualification by
170 companies between 1982 and 1991 and estimated whether disqualification would
have resulted in a net tax benefit for the companies and their employees.127 The authors
determined that in over half of the cases in which there was a net tax benefit, firms failed
to disqualify options.128 The authors concluded that firms trade off tax benefits against
reported earnings.129 Cross-sectional analysis of firms that did and did not disqualify
ISOs yielded some evidence supporting positive accounting theory. The net tax benefit
tended to be larger when options were disqualified; and non-disqualifying firms tended to
be more highly leveraged, and thus would have faced higher debt covenant costs had they
disqualified their ISOs.130
As a final egregious example of companies sacrificing taxes for earnings, consider
a recent study of firms that restated financial statements between 1996 and 2002 as a
result of SEC accusations of accounting fraud.131 This study found that the mean firm
paid $11.85 million in taxes on the phantom earnings, or about $0.11 for each dollar of
inflated earnings.132 Hopefully, these results are not typical. Managers who are willing
to commit fraud to inflate earnings probably are less concerned about shareholder value
than honest managers. Nonetheless, the study emphasizes the obsession of some
managers with reported earnings.
III. DOES ACCOUNTING MATTER? SYNTHESIS OF THE THEORY AND EVIDENCE
There can be little doubt that accounting matters. There is strong evidence that
managers are sensitive to reported earnings and sacrifice cash flow, as in Kamin, to boost
earnings, and that changes in mandatory accounting standards affect corporate behavior.
However, evidence of systematic variation in discretionary accounting choices and in
corporate responses to mandatory accounting standard changes consistent with positive
accounting theory is mixed. As the studies sampled in the previous Part indicate, the debt
covenant hypothesis is perhaps the best supported of the contracting cost theories,133 but
even with respect to the influence of debt, a recent survey article concludes that the
empirical results are inconclusive. The data suggest a relationship between debt and
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accounting, the authors say, but “we cannot draw definitive inferences.”134 Given the
weakness of the stock price reaction studies, it is plausible, perhaps likely, that
accounting choice, lobbying against earnings-reducing standard changes, and reaction to
mandatory standard changes reflects self-serving management behavior as much or more
than concern with contracting costs generally.
Perhaps we should not be too surprised that the evidence supporting the positive
accounting theory explanation is not stronger. There are several reasons to think that the
impact of contracting costs would be limited.
Consider changes in mandatory
accounting standards and the effect of these changes on contracting costs. At most, a
shift from mandatory standard A to standard B that results in lower reported earnings
should have a one-time effect on existing debt covenants. Renegotiation of existing
covenants may be costly, but the adoption of standard B in place of standard A should
have little effect on new debt agreements.135 This is also true of executive compensation
contracts. New agreements should be as easily tuned to standard B as A. The only
persistent effect under this theory has to do with political costs. Changes that reduce
reported earnings could have a lasting effect on regulation if regulators are slow to adjust
their perception of what constitutes normal or excess earnings.
Recall, also, that the impact of accounting change or accounting choice on debt
covenants is not necessarily equal to the increase in the expected cost of default.136 Other
options for dealing with the increased risk, such as renegotiating the covenants or making
operational changes to offset all or part of the increased risk, may be less costly.137 In
addition, as noted above, the contracting cost story does not result in an unambiguous
prediction regarding stock prices.138 Reduced reported earnings should increase the risk
of costly default on debt covenants but also reduce exposure to increased corporate taxes
or provide other political benefits. The effect on executive compensation is ambiguous in
itself. The conflicting effects decrease the chances of finding significant results.
So this brings us back to our original questions. Having reviewed the theory and
empirical evidence, what can we say about Kamin? What can we say about managerial
opposition to expensing stock option compensation? What can we say about the likely
effects of increased book-tax conformity or the potential for instrumental revision of
accounting standards to shape corporate behavior? This Part addresses the first two
questions. The remaining questions require significant elaboration and are examined in
Parts IV and V.
A. Kamin v. American Express
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As for Kamin, the American Express directors justification for distributing the
depreciated DLJ shares, as reflected in the board minutes and reported by the judge in the
case, was that a $26 million “reduction of net income would have a serious effect on the
market value of the publicly traded American Express stock.”139 This seems highly
unlikely. First, as discussed above, even if one is skeptical of the efficiency of U.S. stock
markets, it is very hard to imagine that in this case the market had not already adjusted
American Express’s stock price to reflect the unrealized loss on such a large, discrete,
publicized investment.140 Direct price effects are improbable.
Second, it is difficult to believe that contracting costs related to debt covenants
drove the decision to distribute the securities and forego the tax benefit. In order for this
to have been a rational decision in accordance with positive accounting theory, one would
have to conclude that a one-time $26 million earnings hit increased the expected cost of
technical debt default by $8 million and that renegotiating debt covenants to account for
this charge to earnings would have cost $8 million or more. Moreover, the political cost
story runs counter to the directors’ decision. According to Watts and Zimmerman,
companies prefer to report lower earnings to stave off tax increases or other political
costs.141 That leaves us with employment contract effects. Reported earnings apparently
factored into the compensation of some of the inside directors (and presumably other
employees). If these agreements are sticky, reducing reported earnings could have costs
(lower productivity) and benefits (lower compensation paid), but in all likelihood the net
compensation effect of reduced reported earnings would have been positive for
shareholders. In any event, it seems highly unlikely that the combination of contracting
costs resulting from the one-time charge against earnings could have approached $8
million.
It is much more likely that Kamin is a case of managerial preferences for earnings
far exceeding shareholder preferences and managers acting on those preferences, in other
words, a classic agency problem. It would be nice to be able to say (as I have done in my
corporate law class for several years) that the directors’ decision in Kamin was
unambiguously against shareholder interests, but we cannot honestly say that, given our
current understanding of accounting theory. However, the burden should have been on
the directors to explain how the indirect effects of a one-time earnings hit could offset the
tax benefits foregone. Rather than relying on a general statement about “serious” market
effects of a reduction in net income, the onus should have been on the directors and their
experts to explain why an accounting-driven reduction in earnings would have a serious
effect. Was the company very highly leveraged? Would the earnings reduction have
triggered technical default? Was renegotiation of debt covenants or other alternatives to
foregoing the tax benefit considered? What were the costs of these alternatives? If
management is unable to provide a cost/benefit analysis at least plausibly justifying a
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decision to sacrifice tax benefits for earnings, that decision should not be protected from
judicial scrutiny under the prevailing corporate law standard.142
B. Managerial Opposition to Stock Option Expensing
Similarly, managerial opposition to stock option expensing cannot be dismissed
out of hand as antagonistic to shareholder interests given our current knowledge of
accounting theory. We can be fairly certain that moving fully disclosed stock option
expense from footnote to income statement can have no direct effect on stock prices, but
the change surely will involve some contracting costs. If the debt covenant costs
associated with this earnings-reducing change exceed the political and employment cost
savings, some reduction in share prices should be expected. And, unlike the Kamin
situation, there is no tax or other direct financial benefit associated with the accounting
change to offset the increased contracting costs.143 So, at one level, managerial
opposition to the change seems rational.
However, there are reasons to suspect that managerial opposition to option
expensing exceeds the indirect effect of the standard change on share value. First,
although the standard change would be permanent, debt and compensation agreements
are not. The contracting costs associated with the change can only arise from existing
agreements. New debt agreements and employment contracts can be as easily and
cheaply tied to the new accounting regime as the old one. Second, as in Kamin, political
and employment effects associated with the change presumably would be positive and
offset the other contracting costs to some extent. Third, we should not forget the
evidence that managerial opposition to the 1993 option expensing proposal apparently
reflected concerns with increased management pay exposure rather than contracting
costs, or the evidence from the tax/earnings trade off literature suggesting that managerial
142
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preferences for high reported earnings often overcome apparently more significant cash
flow considerations.
IV. BOOK-TAX CONFORMITY
U.S. public companies maintain separate tax and financial accounts, prepared
under different rules and producing different results. The administrative cost of
maintaining multiple sets of books has long been recognized, but justified as necessary
given the differing purposes of and audiences for tax and financial reports.144 In recent
years, however, the focus has been on the growing gap between earnings reported to
investors (relatively high) and income reported to the taxing authorities (relatively low)
and suspicion that part of this gap represents inappropriate tax avoidance and/or earnings
inflation.145 Of course, part of the gap flows from explicit tax incentives, such as
accelerated tax depreciation, or from recognized financial accounting anomalies, such as
the failure to record compensatory stock options as an expense. It is widely believed,
however, that these deviations represent only part of the gap.146 Reformers argue that tax
shelters and earnings inflation schemes tend to rely on discontinuities between book and
tax accounting. Companies seek out techniques that will allow them to report less
taxable income without reducing reported earnings and they prefer earnings enhancement
schemes that do not result in increased taxable income.147
Eliminating these
discontinuities, it is argued, would tend to discourage these activities.148 In a world of
full conformity between financial and tax accounting rules, companies could not inflate
earnings without paying additional taxes and could not cut taxes without cutting earnings
as well.
Of course, no one suggests that even full book-tax conformity would be a
panacea. Even faced with a tradeoff, firms may inappropriately shelter income from tax
or inflate earnings. In Kamin, the book and tax treatment of the disposition of the shares
were in conformity. American Express faced a tradeoff between minimizing taxes and
maximizing reported earnings, and chose the latter. Of course, Kamin did not involve
accounting fraud or tax sheltering, but the suggestion is that without the counterweight
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provided by conforming book and tax accounting treatments, companies are more likely
to stretch the rules in seeking to maximize earnings and minimize tax.
The pros and cons of increased book-tax conformity have been widely debated.149
However, the behavioral impact of accounting standards has not been fully considered by
the participants in this debate. This Part argues that the behavioral effects would be
largely negative. These negative effects represent an underappreciated cost of book-tax
conformity and provide reason to prefer the alternative of increased disclosure and
reconciliation between financial and tax accounts.
A. Book-Tax Conformity Proposals
Book-tax conformity could be advanced in many ways. Full conformity could be
achieved by assessing corporate taxes on income reported under GAAP, or by requiring
that financial accounts be prepared consistent with the Internal Revenue Code. Both
financial and tax accounting could be based on a compromise set of rules between the
current tax code and GAAP. Other options include using one of the foregoing as a
baseline for both tax and financial reporting but providing for specific deviations for one
of the two sets of books. The most common proposals advocate a partial conformity
approach utilizing GAAP as a baseline but anticipating that Congress would specify
certain discrete deviations for tax accounting.150
Partial conformity is not wholly alien to U.S. accountants. It exists in the U.S. for
inventory accounting. Under current tax rules, companies are allowed to value inventory
under either a “first in, first out” (FIFO) approach, in which case the value of inventory
tends to approximate current costs, or a “last-in, first-out” (LIFO) approach, in which
case historic inventory values tend to persist. However, companies electing to use the
LIFO approach for tax purposes are required to use the same approach to valuing
inventories in preparing the accounts presented to investors.151 In a period of rising
prices, LIFO inventory valuation results in less taxable income than FIFO valuation.152
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Scholarly articles proposing or supporting some form of increased book-tax conformity include
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But LIFO valuation also results in reduced reported earnings in inflationary times. This
is the natural check that book-tax conformity provides and explains why some firms
“voluntarily” pay taxes that could be eliminated by adopting LIFO and reporting lower
earnings for both purposes.153
Inventory accounting is an isolated example of book-tax conformity in the U.S.
Book-tax conformity is much more common in countries that traditionally have relied
less on public markets to provide corporate finance, such as Germany, France, and
Japan.154 In these countries mandated conformity often allows for company choice along
the lines of the U.S. LIFO/FIFO example. German companies, for example, may elect to
accelerate depreciation for tax purposes only if the depreciation deductions are reflected
equally in the financial accounts.155
Of course, in one sense the current U.S. system could be thought of as a “partial”
book-tax conformity system. The tax code does provide that “[t]axable income shall be
computed under the method of accounting on the basis of which the taxpayer regularly
computes his income in keeping his books.”156 But the exceptions swallow the rule, and
the courts have long acknowledged that taxpayers cannot rely on GAAP where contrary
to tax rules and regulations.157
B. Issues and Concerns with Book-Tax Conformity Proposals
My principal aim in this Part is to call attention to several unrecognized or
underappreciated problems with book-tax conformity that arise from the effects of
accounting on managerial and corporate behavior. However, before addressing those
issues in the next section, this section summarizes and expands upon a number of other
concerns with increased conformity.
1. Information Loss
The primary aim of financial accounting is to provide relevant, reliable,
consistent, and comparable financial information to the capital markets in order to ensure
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and taxable income in a period of rising oil prices, LIFO is unambiguously positive for the oil majors. See
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efficient allocation of resources,158 and a principal concern of accounting researchers is
that book-tax conformity would lead to a loss of value-relevant information.159
Generally, financial accounting standards best fulfill their information-providing role
when they produce results that mirror economic accounting results, e.g., when financial
depreciation mirrors economic depreciation. Thus, it has been argued that requiring
financial statements to be prepared on the basis of tax accounting rules, or even
conforming somewhere in between current financial and tax accounting rules, would
result in the loss of value-relevant information.160 Studies demonstrate that financial
statements are indeed less relevant in countries in which tax rules influence financial
accounting rules.161
However, research shows that tax and financial accounts contribute individually
to the efficiency of the market.162 As a result, even if GAAP were accepted as the basis
for both books, there would be a loss of information.163 To be sure, the loss would be
greater if financial accounts were prepared on the basis of the tax rules, but the
elimination of either set of books would be costly from an information perspective.164
2. Control of Tax Policy
Some commentators doubt that Congress would be willing to cede control over
tax rules to the FASB.165 Full conformity based on GAAP would result in a change in tax
law every time the FASB issued a new standard. Even partial conformity with a GAAP
baseline would cede substantial control of tax policy to the FASB. Unless Congress had
already enacted a specific exception for a particular item or transaction, a change in
GAAP would result in a change in tax unless and until Congress acted to override the
change for tax purposes. Other arrangements for sharing responsibility are feasible, but a
GAAP baseline for tax assessment seriously conflicts with congressional control over tax
policy.166
Of course, some commentators, following the lead of Stanley Surrey, would
applaud a change that would make it more difficult for Congress to implement social or
158

See Financial Accounting Standards Board, Facts about FASB, at www.FASB.org (providing
FASB mission statement).
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economic policy via the tax code.167 But the idea of Congress abandoning tax incentives
is probably unrealistic. One could argue that if Congress’ principal concern was the
revenue associated with the corporate tax, Congress could easily cede responsibility for
tax accounting to the FASB and simply adjust the tax rates as necessary. However, if one
believes that Congress is as or more concerned with economic intervention via the tax
code, then the likelihood is that a GAAP baseline tax with specific exceptions would
rapidly degenerate into something approaching the current tax code as Congress enacted
various tax favors, incentives and penalties. It seems much more likely that tax rules
would serve as the basis for any book-tax conformity proposal acceptable to Congress.
3. Instability Generally
Essentially for the reasons given above, Hanlon and Shevlin have argued that
partial conformity is inherently unstable, particularly partial conformity based on a
GAAP baseline.168 Once exceptions to a GAAP-based tax are allowed, they argue,
special interest lobbying would lead to greater and greater discontinuities. Full
conformity may be unrealistic, but if achieved it could possibly be maintained. It is
difficult to imagine a GAAP-based tax with a handful of specific tax exceptions not
becoming two essentially separate systems.
4. Politicization of the Financial Accounting Standard Setting Process
Compared with the tax writing process, financial accounting standard setting
seems blissfully non-political. Of course, business people lobby the FASB,169 and
Congress and the SEC exert their influence from time to time,170 but by maintaining its
emphasis on neutral rules of accounting, the FASB has deflected a great deal of potential
interference. Increased book-tax conformity would almost inevitably lead to the
politicization of financial accounting.171
Consider the scenario in which current tax rules or some hybrid between current
tax and accounting rules enacted by Congress form the basis for both sets of books.
Financial accounting would become just as much a political football as taxes are today,
and lobbying would increase for the following reasons: First, public companies would
have more at stake in the rules selected by Congress, since these rules would control for
both tax and accounting purposes. Second, Congress’s freedom to insert special interest
accounting favors (or penalties) would increase given the shift from a single goal of
promulgating neutral accounting standards to a multi-purpose, multi-policy tax and
accounting standard setting process. Increasing the stakes in a venue that is more
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susceptible to lobbying would increase the expected payoffs from lobbying, and thus
should result in more lobbying.172
On the other hand, suppose that a GAAP-based tax approach were adopted with
specific tax deviations enacted by Congress. The FASB’s influence over taxes would be
significant in any mixed responsibility scenario. Despite FASB’s neutrality stance,
businesses could be expected to increase their lobbying of that organization, given the
increased stakes involved in the FASB’s pronouncements, and, since the odds of a
congressional tax override would be uncertain, pressure on and by individual members of
Congress to intervene in the FASB’s deliberations would be intense. It may not be
realistic to expect a private group of accountants to be able to navigate these political
waters and successfully set both accounting rules and default tax rules. Even if it is
feasible, this would not be an appropriate role for a private organization like the FASB.
This realization provides further reason to think that conformity, if it is to occur, is more
likely to happen at the tax end of the spectrum and fall firmly within congressional
control. The primary point, however, is that any book-tax conformity proposal entails the
politicization of financial accounting standard setting.
C. Book-Tax Conformity and Corporate Behavior
The costs of book-tax conformity described above are serious, but of course the
benefits could be greater. This section, however, presents several additional concerns
arising out of the effects of accounting results on managerial and corporate behavior that
further undermine the case for book-tax conformity. In brief, the concerns are that
increased book-tax conformity (1) is less likely to forestall artificial earnings inflation
than most commentators assume, and indeed may result in excessive sacrifice of tax
benefits for earnings; (2) will result in reduced consistency in financial reporting than
exists today, making cross company comparisons more difficult; and (3) will undermine
economic incentives whether conformity occurs at the tax end of the spectrum, the book
end, or somewhere in between.
1. Accounting and Operational Flexibility and the Book-Tax Tradeoff
Because of the forced tradeoff between high reported earnings and happy
investors on the one hand, and low taxable earnings and low corporate taxes on the other,
book-tax conformity has been suggested as a response both to tax sheltering and artificial
earnings inflation, depending on the dominant concern at the time. Fair enough, but is
book-tax conformity more likely to reduce sheltering or inflated earnings? Where would
172

According to the economic theory of regulation, the benefits and burdens that are granted or
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firms come out on the continuum between tax minimization and earnings maximization?
As long as there is some managerial discretion over accounting choice and operational
decisions, it would be impossible for a regulator to tie corporations to a point along that
continuum.
Most commentators who have addressed this issue have suggested that tax
minimization would dominate.173 The analysis developed herein suggests otherwise. It
seems likely that book-tax conformity would result in managers sacrificing tax benefits
for earnings to a greater extent than shareholders would prefer. Thus, increased book-tax
conformity may be a partial answer to tax sheltering, but is unlikely to hinder artificial
earnings inflation and indeed may result in some reduction in share values as managers
act to maximize their own utility rather than that of shareholders.
a. Flexibility in Managing Taxes and Earnings
Whether conformity is achieved based on GAAP, the tax code, or something in
between, managers would retain flexibility to manage taxes and earnings. Current GAAP
is much more flexible than the tax code, and a certain degree of financial accounting
flexibility is generally viewed as a positive feature. As discussed above, there are many
users of financial data, and the flexibility in GAAP allows firms to choose the accounting
treatments that most efficiently portray data and minimize contracting costs.174 But given
the flexibility of GAAP, assessing corporate tax on reported income would provide
companies with broad discretion to minimize tax or maximize reported earnings with
respect to such key inputs as recognition of revenues and costs, inventory valuation, and
depreciation.175
A book-tax conformity approach utilizing a GAAP baseline with specific tax
departures could provide either more or less flexibility than a straight GAAP-based tax,
depending on whether the departures were mandated or made optional. In all likelihood,
the result would be some of both. One can imagine Congress providing optional tax
incentives for items such as depreciation and mandatory tax penalties for items such as
non-performance based executive compensation.176
The current tax code provides less flexibility than GAAP, but some discretion
does exist. For example, accelerated tax depreciation is not mandatory; firms can elect to
apply straight-line tax depreciation.177 Firms may elect to deduct certain research and
experimental expenditures instead of capitalizing them, but they are not forced to.178
Of course, even if accounting rules were fixed, accounting discretion would
remain to the extent of operational discretion. For example, many companies have
173
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significant flexibility in managing accruals at year end.179 Under any of these
approaches, operational flexibility would leave firms with choices between minimizing
taxes and maximizing reported earnings.
b. The Book/Tax Tradeoff
How would firms exercise accounting and operational discretion in a book-tax
conformity regime? Firm believers in the efficient capital markets hypothesis suggest
that the primary result would be reduced reported income. Calvin Johnson has argued
that companies would find other ways to communicate information to investors and
would manage their books solely with an eye to minimizing taxes.180 Michelle Hanlon
and Terry Shevlin have suggested that book-tax conformity could lead to a race to the
bottom on effective tax rates.181 Peter Joos and Mark Lang have argued that book-tax
conformity in Germany and France “has provided incentives to reduce taxes by reporting
lower profits.”182
Other commentators are less convinced, pointing out the moderating effect of
management’s motivation to report high earnings.183 The lessons of this Article go
further: Increased book-tax conformity would likely lead to increased instances of
managers sacrificing legitimate tax benefits in order to boost reported earnings.
At the very least, the tax/earnings tradeoff literature provides strong evidence that
increased book-tax conformity that leaves discretion with managers to choose between
high earnings/high tax and low earnings/low tax treatments would not result in tax
minimization. And positive accounting theory indicates that, to some extent, sacrificing
taxes could be in the shareholders’ interest. A tax minimization position would result in
lower reported earnings that would increase the expected cost of debt covenant violation.
At least for some firms, the potential costs of financial distress would outweigh the tax
savings associated with reporting the lowest possible levels of tax and financial income.
However, given the direct and indirect effect of reported earnings on their
compensation and other factors, managerial decision makers are likely to sacrifice taxes
for earnings to a greater extent than necessary to maximize share value. Book-tax
conformity is likely to reduce tax sheltering, but there is nothing to force managers to
balance taxes against earnings in the shareholders’ interests. The tax/earnings balance
struck by management is likely to result in share value reductions and represents an
underappreciated cost of increased book-tax conformity.184
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2. Discretion and Cross Company Consistency in Financial Reporting
While enhanced book-tax conformity would increase consistency between the
books of a given firm, conformity could result in a decrease in the consistency and
comparability of accounting results between companies in the same industry, assuming
some flexibility in accounting treatment in a book-tax conformity regime. Assuming that
the markets see through accounting presentation, decreased inter-company consistency is
not necessarily fatal to book-tax conformity proposals, but it does represent an added
cost. To some extent, analysts would have to work harder to produce comparable
figures.185
Consider depreciation. Although businesses are permitted to employ one of a
number of approved financial depreciation methods for various depreciable assets, the
most common technique is straight-line depreciation, which simply prorates the cost of
the asset, less estimated salvage value, over the estimated useful life of the asset.186
Straight-line financial depreciation is widely admired for its simplicity, but it is unlikely
that this trait explains its dominance. After all, the same firms that utilize straight-line
depreciation for financial reporting purposes utilize accelerated depreciation for tax
purposes. Rather, straight-line depreciation is used for book purposes because, compared
to the other permitted methods, it results in reduced depreciation expense and greater
reported income in early years and increased expense and reduced reported income in
later years.187 In other words, utilizing straight-line financial depreciation allows firms to
maximize the present value of earnings reported to investors, while adopting accelerated
depreciation methods for tax purposes allows firms to minimize the present value of
taxes.
Imagine that corporate taxes were to be assessed on the basis of GAAP income.
Firms would face a tradeoff between tax minimization and earnings maximization.
Managers focused on tax minimization would adopt highly accelerated depreciation
methods; those focused on earnings would select straight-line depreciation; some might
compromise by selecting a modestly accelerated depreciation method. What factors
would drive the choice? Positive accounting theory suggests that contracting costs would
play a role, in which case firm size, degree of leverage, and the extent of earnings-based
compensation arrangements would all matter. The previous section argued that
management earnings preferences would be a key factor, and the strength of those
preferences and the extent to which they would be satisfied would depend on executive
185
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compensation design and other factors, including the quality of corporate governance.
Given this multiplicity of factors, which may or may not be correlated among firms in a
particular industry, accounting choices could vary widely even among firms in a single
industry. Surely, they would vary more widely than they do today.
I do not wish to overemphasize this point, and I do not suggest that the cost
resulting from greater inter-firm variation in accounting choices would be significant. A
nuanced view of the ECMH recognizes that information gathering and assimilation is
costly. Decreased inter-firm consistency in accounting choice would directionally
increase analytical costs, but in all likelihood the impact on market efficiency would be
minimal.
3. Book-Tax Conformity and Economic Incentives
We have already considered the effect of book-tax conformity on firm choices
among acceptable accounting treatments and operational decisions with accounting
implications, such as year-end accruals. This section considers a related but much more
pervasive and important issue: How would book-tax conformity affect the explicit
economic incentives Congress provides in the tax code and the implicit economic
incentives embedded in GAAP? I argue that increased book-tax conformity would
undermine economic incentives whether conformity is based on GAAP, on the tax code,
on something in between, or left to company discretion.
a. Tax Incentives
As every student of basic federal income tax knows, the tax code is riddled with
provisions that have little or nothing to do with “defining” income, i.e., determining the
right level of income subject to tax in a platonic sense, and everything to do with
providing incentives or subsidies to taxpayers. A familiar example is IRC § 106 which
generally excludes from the gross income of employees the value of employer provided
health care and health insurance. Other in-kind benefits are included in an employee’s
income, so this exclusion represents a clear subsidy for the creation of employer funded
health care plans.
Many of these tax incentives are directed at corporate behavior and at spurring
business investment, including accelerated tax depreciation,188 “bonus” depreciation,189
investment tax credits,190 and special “expensing” provisions permitting immediate
deduction of expenditures that otherwise must be capitalized and recovered through
depreciation.191 The effect of each of these tax incentives is to increase the present value
of deductions (and/or tax credits) associated with the expenditure and thus reduce the
present value of taxes. By reducing the tax burden associated with qualified capital
188
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expenditures, Congress expects businesses will devote more of their resources to or
accelerate capital investment.
Full book-tax conformity utilizing a GAAP as a baseline would eliminate many of
these tax incentives.192 Unless the tax incentives were replaced with direct subsidies or
other non-tax incentives, we should expect some shift away from capital investment.
Moreover, while some of the investment incentives are generic (accelerated depreciation
applies to almost all depreciable assets and has been relatively stable over time), others
are highly focused. For example, investment tax credits currently are available for
alternative energy development193 and historic structure rehabilitation.194 Taxpayers may
elect to deduct or capitalize periodical circulation expenses,195 certain research and
experimental expenditures,196 soil and water conservation costs,197 environmental
remediation costs,198 and certain other expenditures.199 In a bid to spur economic
recovery in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Congress implemented a limited term,
“bonus” depreciation provision allowing businesses to deduct immediately 30% (later
increased to 50%) of otherwise depreciable capital expenditures.200 Although one can
argue that these incentives could be more efficiently delivered by other means, the loss of
these incentives is an argument against taxing corporate income on the basis of GAAP.
More to the point, Congress is unlikely to relinquish the opportunity to intervene,
whether its focused incentives reflect special interest lobbying or rational responses to
market failures.
b. Accounting Incentives
One might be tempted to think that the economic incentive problem could be
solved by conforming book and tax at the tax end of the spectrum, rather than the GAAP
end, in other words, by reporting taxable income to both investors and the IRS. But that
is not the case. As we have seen, accounting rules affect managerial behavior much as
tax rules do, and adopting the Internal Revenue Code for financial accounting would
eliminate many implicit accounting incentives.
Reconsider depreciation. As noted above, today most firms utilize straight-line
financial depreciation for most items because the method is simple, but more importantly,
because straight-line depreciation tends to maximize the present value of reported
earnings.201 Because managers are motivated to report high earnings, the option to
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employ earnings enhancing straight-line depreciation (relative to accelerated
depreciation) can be viewed as a financial accounting incentive for capital investment.
If firms were required to utilize the tax depreciation rules in preparing their
financial reports, their appetite for capital investment would be lessened. Under the
accelerated depreciation methods generally used for tax, the present value of reported
expenses associated with capital investment would increase substantially, leading to
deferral of capital investment or substitution away from capital investment and in favor
of leasing or other non-capital operational alternatives at the margin. To be sure, the tax
code permits firms to utilize straight-line depreciation,202 but even this election would not
fully eliminate the earnings hit from the change in rules, given non-elective tax rules
related to salvage value and depreciation periods that also accelerate deductions.203 Of
course, any depreciation baseline is essentially arbitrary. There is no one correct
depreciation technique that reproduces economic depreciation for all assets. But whether
straight-line financial depreciation represents a subsidy or normality is unimportant, the
point is that this and other gaps between GAAP and the tax code can be thought of as tax
incentives, accounting incentives, or a mix of the two.
In many cases “GAAP incentives” are simply the flip-side of tax incentives. In
other words, the financial accounting treatment may approximate economic reality, while
the tax rules reflect subsidies. To some extent this is the case for depreciation. Another
example is the disparate treatment of municipal bond interest. The interest on such bonds
is not included in taxable income and generally is viewed as a subsidy to state and local
governments that are able to reduce their borrowing costs through the issuance of these
bonds.204 But the interest received is included in reported earnings.205 Adopting a tax
baseline for both tax and book purposes would preserve the tax incentive but introduce a
financial accounting disincentive for corporations to purchase municipal bonds.
In other cases, GAAP permits income-increasing or income-accelerating
accounting procedures relative to clearly more neutral treatments incorporated in the tax
code. Examples include the failure to require expensing of compensatory stock options
until this year and the recent elimination of the requirement to amortize purchased
goodwill.206 Because these deviations resulted from industry lobbying, it is not surprising
that they are income enhancing. What is surprising is that they have not been recognized
as incentives, although they should be. Conforming GAAP with the arguably more
neutral tax treatment of these items would tend to discourage the use of compensatory
options and discourage merger activity.
The bottom line is that whether an accounting rule can be said to be neutral and
economically correct and the corresponding tax rule to be the deviation and the incentive,
or vice versa, it is important to mind the gap. Eliminating the gap in either direction will
reduce the tax incentive, create an accounting disincentive, or do some of both.
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c. Economic Consequences of Eliminating Accounting Incentives
The theory and evidence suggest that the elimination of implicit accounting
incentives in GAAP relative to the tax code would have economic effects comparable to
the elimination of tax incentives as a result of adopting a GAAP-based tax. First,
consider the effect of an earnings-decreasing change in accounting standards under the
contracting cost theory, perhaps a shift from straight-line to accelerated depreciation.
The debt covenant theory predicts that such a change would result in an indirect decrease
in share prices. The markets would see through the accounting change in pricing
company securities, but the reduction in reported earnings would make it more likely that
firms would violate sticky debt covenants, increasing the expected cost of covenant
violation. Reduced political costs might offset the debt covenant effect, as lowered
reported earnings deflect the attention of congressional tax writers. In addition, sticky
employment contracts that are based in part on reported earnings would tend to result in
reduced compensation payments that might or might not be accompanied by reduced
productivity. If debt covenant effects dominate, as suggested by the positive accounting
theory literature, one would expect a net reduction in share prices resulting from an
earnings-decreasing change in accounting standards. Thus, a shareholder-loyal manager
would tend to make operational choices, including reduced capital investment, reflecting
the earnings-decreasing change in accounting.
Once again, however, managerial appetite for earnings may exceed that of
shareholders. Even if the negative effect of an earnings-decreasing standard change on
stock prices is modest, managers may strongly resist the change and adjust operations to
avoid it for self-serving reasons. As noted above, managers may honestly, but incorrectly
believe that reduced reported earnings directly reduce share prices, they may be
socialized into placing inordinate emphasis on high reported earnings, or they may
simply react to the negative effect of reduced reported earnings on their own
compensation.
We have already reviewed a great deal of empirical evidence suggesting that
managers respond to financial accounting effects. I do not wish to rehash that evidence
here, but we should consider what this evidence tells us about the potential impact of an
earnings-decreasing change in accounting standards, such as a shift to the more
accelerated depreciation rules of the tax code. There are several reasons to be cautious of
reading too much into the empirical record. First, cases like Kamin concerning very
large, one-time earnings hits, do not provide convincing evidence that managers take
reported earnings into account in making day to day operational or investment decisions.
Second, while the evidence indicating that stock option use has been largely accounting
driven supports instrumental accounting, managers, as we have discussed, have a
particular reason for wanting to keep their own compensation as obscure as possible,
making it hard to generalize from that example. Perhaps the most persuasive evidence
supporting significant behavioral responses to accounting standards lies in corporate
reaction to earlier standard changes such as SFAS 106, which replaced pay-as-you-go
accounting for post-retirement health care benefits with accrual accounting, and SFAS
13, which moved capital lease disclosures out of the footnotes and onto balance sheets.
In both cases companies responded by making operational changes as if the reduced
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reported earnings mattered. In one case, managers slashed benefits; in the other they
shifted away from capital leases towards more accounting-friendly operating leases.207
Overall, the theory and evidence suggests that accounting matters and that
managers would respond to earnings-decreasing shifts in GAAP in a predictable fashion.
However, one might assume that the economic effect would be transitory if contracting
costs are an important part of the story. Once old debt agreements expire and new
contracts are written taking into account tax code-based accounting standards, would the
accounting disincentives disappear? In fact, they would not. Imagine that initially all
companies employ straight-line financial depreciation. Next, Congress requires that
financial depreciation be calculated under the more accelerated tax depreciation rules.
The change has the effect of increasing the present value of expenses and decreasing the
present value of earnings associated with capital investment. Under the debt covenant
hypothesis, the share value of capital intensive companies would fall and firms would
reduce or defer capital investment at the margin. Ultimately, corporate borrowers and
lenders would respond to the new accounting environment by negotiating covenants
associated with new bond offerings in which the level of earnings that triggers default is
lowered. So equilibrium between corporate borrowers and lenders is restored. But that
does not mean that the accounting bias against capital investment is eliminated. It
persists. If a company were to ramp back up its capital expenditures, it would suffer a
decrease in the present value of reported earnings, increasing the expected cost of default.
4. Economic Consequences and Flexible Book-Tax Conformity
The foregoing analysis suggests that reduction of the gap between tax and
financial accounting would have adverse economic consequences however the gap is
reduced. But it also suggests that if full conformity is the objective, how it is achieved
matters. Allowing firms to choose the basis for conformity could minimize the adverse
economic consequences. On the other hand, given flexibility, managers would be
expected to make the earnings/tax tradeoff that maximizes their own utility, rather than
shareholder value. On balance, it is unclear whether providing flexibility in book-tax
conformity would benefit shareholders or not.
Individual company flexibility in achieving book-tax conformity is common. As
we have seen, the one example of book-tax conformity currently in place in the U.S.
requires consistency between LIFO and FIFO accounting for book and tax reporting, but
leaves the choice up to individual companies.208 Similarly, German rules allow firms to
choose between straight-line and accelerated depreciation, as long as they are
consistent.209 Moreover, these choices need not be binary. One can imagine permitting
firms to select from a range of depreciation methods as long as internal consistency is
maintained.
Shareholder-loyal managers could use such flexibility to minimize the adverse
economic consequences of book-tax conformity. Firms that were relatively insensitive to
reported earnings (because non-public or flush with cash) would select the conforming
207
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treatment that minimized taxes, such as accelerated depreciation. Firms that were
relatively insensitive to taxes (because of large net operating losses) would select the
conforming treatment that maximized earnings. Firms in between these extremes would
trade off earnings maximization against tax minimization.
Well governed firms would make these trade offs with an eye towards
maximizing share value. The concern, of course, is that managers of many firms would
sacrifice taxes for earnings to a greater extent than necessary to optimize share value. Of
course, even if conforming treatments are specified by Congress, many managers would
utilize operational flexibility in the same way. However, adding flexibility in accounting
treatments is likely to exacerbate the agency problem.
D. Further Book-Tax Conformity Alternatives and Alternatives to Conformity
Full book-tax conformity is problematic from an economic consequences
perspective. Better from this standpoint are partial book-tax conformity proposals, such
as the idea of utilizing a GAAP baseline with specific tax deviations adopted by
Congress. For example, Mitchell Engler has proposed a more nuanced approach to booktax conformity that would maintain intended tax incentives, such as accelerated
depreciation, while closing pernicious gaps.210 Maintaining the disparate treatment of
depreciation for tax and book purposes would maintain current tax and accounting
incentives. Further, compared to the German flexible depreciation model, this proposal
would limit the extent to which managers would inappropriately sacrifice taxes for
reported earnings. The problem, of course, is identifying the pernicious gaps. Almost all
deviations between GAAP and the tax code result in tax and/or accounting incentives.
And, of course, as Hanlon and Shevlin have argued, the stability of partial book-tax
conformity is open to question.
Although at first blush increased book-tax conformity seems an attractive
approach to combating tax sheltering and artificial earnings inflation, commentators have
pointed out numerous problems with proposals for enhanced conformity. The adverse
economic consequences of increasing book-tax conformity, whatever the method, add to
the arguments against adopting this tool and in favor of other means of attacking these
problems, principally enhanced disclosure and reconciliation of book-tax differences.211
Detailed consideration of the merits of these alternatives is beyond the scope of this
Article, but it is worth noting that unlike increased book-tax conformity, enhanced
disclosure and reconciliation would add to the information available to the market and
would have little or no economic consequence. Like footnotes to accounting statements,
the tax reconciliation reports would have no affect on reported earnings or taxes paid. Of
course, mandating more extensive reconciliations would increase rather than decrease
compliance costs, but given the adverse economic consequences of book-tax conformity
and other drawbacks, disclosure and reconciliation may be the superior approach.
V. INSTRUMENTAL ACCOUNTING
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This final Part considers a series of related policy questions that are prompted by
recognition of the economic consequences of accounting standards, as outlined in the
previous Parts: If earnings-decreasing shifts in GAAP made to increase book-tax
conformity would have adverse economic consequences, would earnings-increasing
adjustments to GAAP have positive economic consequences? Book-tax conformity
aside, should we consider the economic consequences of accounting in the standard
setting process? More affirmatively, should accounting standards be used instrumentally
as a means of encouraging investment or otherwise shaping corporate behavior, an
alternative to tax incentives, direct subsidies and legal mandates?
Of course, there would be drawbacks to adopting accounting standards that
deviate from economic accounting, but in a second best world, they might serve as a
valuable addition to the public policy toolbox. As we will see, replacing tax incentives or
direct subsidies with accounting incentives could reduce the burden on the public fisc.
However, the costs would be significant as well. Embracing instrumental accounting
would open up the standard setting process to lobbying and potential capture by the
interest group with the most at stake – corporate management. In addition, purposeful
deviation from economic accounting would diminish the usefulness of accounting reports
to investors and other users. This final Part briefly considers the potential benefits and
costs of instrumental accounting. Although an omniscient and benevolent power could
increase social welfare though the use of explicit accounting incentives, Congress is not
such a power, and this Part tentatively concludes that social welfare is probably
maximized by minimizing Congress’ role in accounting and leaving the FASB to achieve
as well as it can “neutral” standards of accounting.
A. How Would Instrumental Accounting Work?
Instrumental accounting would entail designing substantive financial accounting
standards with a view towards shaping managerial, and thus corporate, behavior.
Analogous to tax incentives and penalties, accounting incentives and penalties would
represent purposeful deviations from ideal or “economic” accounting standards, i.e.,
standards that result in income figures that most closely approximate real world results.
Historically, the FASB has rejected deviations from economic accounting for the purpose
of providing incentives.212 This is not to say, however, that current accounting standards
always match economic accounting. Achievement of ideal accounting standards is
limited by at least two factors. First, the fundamental principal of conservatism results in
a bias in favor of early recognition of expense and deferred recognition of income versus
economic accounting.213 Second, ideal accounting would be prohibitively costly. Given
the almost infinite variety of circumstances encountered by businesses, some simplifying
rules of recognition must be employed to make the system operable.214 Within these
constraints, however, the FASB has sought to approximate economic accounting.
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However, the potential for financial depreciation incentives is plain. As an
example, let us again return to depreciation. As noted in the previous Part, shifting from
straight-line to accelerated financial depreciation would result in reduced present value of
reported earnings, thereby discouraging capital investment. Suppose, however, that
Congress were to direct the SEC to permit decelerated financial depreciation for a certain
class of assets.215 Businesses purchasing these assets could adopt a depreciation schedule
that would result in even greater reported income in early years (because of smaller
deductions in early years), with offsetting reductions in income in later years, compared
against straight-line depreciation. Given all of the incentives discussed in previous Parts
for managers to increase the present value of reported earnings, the option to adopt
decelerated financial depreciation would spur investment in this class of assets.
The recent treatment of employee stock options suggests an even more direct
means of providing accounting incentives – permitting companies to simply “footnote”
the relevant expense rather than reducing reported earnings. Suppose, for example, that
Congress wishes to spur corporate charitable contributions. These contributions are
deductible for corporate tax purposes,216 but many corporations pay little or no tax due to
losses incurred in previous years, other tax incentives that they have embraced, and, in
some cases, questionable tax shelters.217 Moreover, the tax deduction will only go so far
in spurring contributions by even tax paying businesses. Thus, Congress might decide
that further incentives are in order. Suppose that Congress were to permit companies to
refrain from “expensing” qualifying contributions, as long as the contributions were fully
disclosed in a footnote to the financial statements, just as stock option expense was
footnoted between 1995 and 2005. The result, of course, would be that charitable
contributions would be free from an accounting perspective, and much more attractive to
managers. Obviously, this footnoting technique could be used with virtually any current
corporate expense that Congress wished to encourage, such as the cost of employer
provided health care (either in place of or in addition to the current tax incentive),
qualified pension contributions, etc.
B. Benefits of Instrumental Accounting
The primary benefit of providing corporate incentives through financial
accounting rules would be the lack of cost to the public fisc. Replacing tax incentives or
direct subsidies with accounting incentives would allow Congress to fund other
programs, reduce tax rates, or pay down debt. Alternatively, accounting incentives could
vehicles, pieces of equipment, and structures owned by a business would be prohibitive, financial
accounting standards provide for a limited menu of depreciation schedules.
215
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be adopted in addition to existing non-accounting incentives, providing more total
incentives without increasing taxes, and potentially filling gaps in the reach of current
incentive programs. I am not suggesting that accounting incentives represent a free
lunch. As discussed in the next sections, there would be significant costs associated with
increased lobbying, potential regulatory capture, increased complexity, and diminished
financial statement value. However, the fiscal effects of instrumental accounting would
be positive.
As Stanley Surrey pointed out, direct governmental subsidies and tax incentives
have an equivalent impact on the public fisc.218 Suppose Congress were to replace a tax
incentive, such as accelerated tax depreciation, with a direct subsidy that returns the same
aggregate dollars to the eligible businesses. This change would have no overall effect on
tax rates because the additional tax revenues raised by eliminating the tax incentive
would be needed to fund the direct subsidy. On the other hand, replacing either a tax
incentive or a direct subsidy with an accounting incentive reduces the burden on the
public fisc.
Each year Congress’s Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) prepares a “tax
expenditure budget” that estimates the economic benefits provided by various tax
preferences and incentives as compared with “normal” taxation.219 Whether and how a
normal tax baseline can be defined is subject to great debate, and no one suggests that the
figures can be used to estimate the revenue effects of eliminating the tax incentives, since
behavior would change.220 Nonetheless, the figures give us some idea of the magnitude
of the benefits provided through the tax code. The JCT’s estimate for corporate tax
expenditures for 2005 was $86 billion.221 24% of that total, $21 billion, was attributable
to accelerated tax depreciation and provisions allowing otherwise depreciable items to be
deducted immediately.222 Decelerating tax depreciation, while at the same time
providing an earnings break for depreciation, could have a significant impact on the fisc
while maintaining investment incentives.
Corporate sensitivity to accounting incentives would vary significantly depending
on company leverage, size, and managerial sensitivity to reported earnings. But, of
course, this is also true of tax incentives, and a mix of tax and accounting incentives
potentially could be optimal. Firms that are flush with cash and profits may be relatively
insensitive to reported earnings but quite sensitive to tax incentives; while firms that are
unprofitable and nearing financial distress may be relatively insensitive to tax incentives
but highly sensitive to earnings-increasing accounting choices.223
C. The Costs of Instrumental Accounting
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Embracing explicit accounting incentives as a regular tool of public policy would
result in numerous dislocations and costs. First, although positive accounting theorists
focus on contracting costs from an issuer’s perspective, there are other parties to these
contracts. Earnings-increasing changes in standards would result in some shifting of
wealth from creditors to debtors. Second, instrumental use of accounting standards
necessitates accepting deviations from accounting rules that most closely reflect the
economic reality of various transactions. Such deviations entail costs arising from
degradation of the information content of financial statements. Third, shifting the venue
of some governmental economic intervention to the accounting arena would result in a
shift and perhaps an increase in lobbying activity, and we might worry whether the
standard setting process would be particularly susceptible to regulatory capture. Fourth,
incorporating explicit accounting incentives into U.S. GAAP could undermine
international convergence of accounting standards. Finally, there are a number of
inefficiencies associated with providing incentives through the tax code, such as
misplaced administrative responsibility, that might also apply to accounting incentives.
1. Impact on Corporate Creditors
Under the debt covenant theory, an accounting standard change that
increases/decreases reported earnings, loosens/tightens sticky covenants, leading to an
indirect increase/decrease in the share price of leveraged firms affected by the accounting
change. Of course, there is another party to these debt covenants, the lender, and to some
extent the shareholders’ gains or losses are offset by losses or gains to the lender.
Imagine an accounting standard change that decreases reported earnings, pushing a
corporation closer to violation of its debt covenants and costly default. Clearly this is
costly for the firm, but the lender may benefit. Companies may take other steps that
reduce the risk of default that they would not otherwise have taken. In other words,
companies may reduce the risk of actual default in order to offset the increased risk of
technical default arising from the change in standards, and that benefits the lender.
Positive accounting theory suggests that there will be an overall economic loss in this
situation. Presumably, the corporate borrower and lender negotiated the ideal debt
covenant based on previous accounting standards and the change in standard results in a
suboptimal outcome. Nonetheless, the net economic loss is likely to be less than the loss
to the shareholders.
By the same token, an earnings-increasing change in accounting standards pushes
debtor corporations further from the brink of insolvency, reducing the expected cost of
technical default, but because the standard change has no affect on the risk of actual
default, the change undermines the protection afforded by the debt covenants, which is
costly to lenders. Again, this is unlikely to be a “zero-sum” effect assuming, reasonably,
that renegotiation of the covenants is not costless. The point, however, is that there is no
free lunch. The benefit to debtors from earnings-increasing standard changes is costly to
lenders.
However, the cost of earnings-increasing accounting changes for lenders is
limited and probably would become even more limited if Congress were to embrace
instrumental accounting. First, only existing debt agreements are affected by a change in
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accounting standards. New agreements can be as easily tuned to standard B as to
standard A. Second, although debt covenants generally are tied to “floating GAAP”
today, meaning GAAP in force at the time of measurement, covenants could easily be
tied to “frozen GAAP,” the rules in force when the debt covenant is signed. Shifting to
frozen GAAP also would entail costs, or presumably debt agreements already would be
written in this fashion, but in an environment in which it was expected that Congress
would regularly revise accounting standards to provide incentives, frozen GAAP
agreements might turn out to be more efficient.
2. Degradation of the Usefulness of Financial Reports
There is an old debate in the academic accounting literature as to whether nonaccounting social welfare effects should be taken into account in setting standards. The
accounting purists argued that these “economic consequences” of accounting standards
should be ignored, that the rules should be as neutral as possible and avoid “influencing
behavior in any particular direction.”224 The concern of the purists was that adjusting
standards to reflect non-accounting consequences would lead to a loss of credibility and
confidence in GAAP.225
Opposed were academics who believed that accounting neutrality was
unattainable,226 that standard setters historically had taken non-accounting “economic
consequences” into account in promulgating rules,227 and that it was the affirmative
obligation of the standard setter to take these economic consequences into account.228
This debate has quieted in recent years, and it would appear that the purists won the
aspirational battle, at least. Recent FASB statements uniformly embrace the economic
neutrality objective.229 The only “economic consequence” recognized by FASB as
having a legitimate role in standard setting is the economic benefits of changes “that
result[] in financial statements that are more relevant and representationally faithful, and
thus more useful for decision making.”230
Although unstated, presumably the central concern of the GAAP purists was that
a loss of credibility or confidence in GAAP would be costly. If audited financial
statements become less credible, reliable, or useful as a result of consequentialist changes
in standards, users of these statements would be forced to seek alternative sources of data,
negotiate more protective agreements, or simply accept greater risk in dealing with an
issuer, all of which is costly.
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As highlighted by recent literature from the book-tax conformity debate, the more
general worry is that departure from financial accounting neutrality would have adverse
effects on value-relevance of financial statements.231 However, not all departures from
existing financial accounting standards are equally problematic. As an example, Hanlon
and Shevlin consider the effect on conforming depreciation techniques, specifically using
the accelerated tax depreciation rules for financial reporting. In this case, they argue that
the change would result in a “minimal” loss of information “because economic
depreciation of an asset does not follow either [the tax or book depreciation method]
exactly.”232
More generally, deviating from neutrality in order to provide accounting
incentives results in costly information loss to the markets only if information is truly
lost. As long as the standards are unambiguous, shifting from straight-line financial
depreciation to some explicit decelerated depreciation method, should have minimal
informational impact. Even more clearly, shifting an expense from income statement to
footnote should have no impact on information, just as shifting options expense from
footnote to income statement will have no informational impact.233
Thus, while deviating from neutral accounting principals in order to provide
incentives would inevitably result in some degradation in the value-relevance of financial
statements, the impact could be limited by focusing on the presentation of information,
i.e., shifting expenses to footnotes, and maintaining the overall substance of the
information provided.234 Adverse impact could be limited further by being highly
selective in adopting the instrumental accounting approach. For example, given the
inherent difficulty of matching depreciation schedules to economic depreciation, the
informational cost of adjusting financial depreciation schedules to spark investment
might be modest. Overall, the impact of limited deviations that are carefully
implemented to preserve as much value-relevant information as possible would likely be
small.
3. Lobbying, Regulatory Capture and the Quality of Accounting Incentives
Given the fundamental economic policy issues at stake, instrumental accounting
should be a tool utilized only by Congress, if at all. The FASB has quite correctly
refused to consider economic consequences in its standard setting process. A private
body of accountants is not equipped to weigh non-accounting issues and has no access to
the other, competing means of economic intervention available to Congress. Thus,
embracing instrumental accounting would entail relocating some responsibility for the
standard setting process from the FASB to Congress. Primary responsibility could
231
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remain with the FASB, with Congress intervening from time to time with respect to
particular standards, or, following the tax model, primary responsibility could be shifted
to Congress with implementation entrusted to a governmental agency or perhaps the
FASB. In either scenario, however, we should expect increased lobbying over standards,
worry about the potential for capture by managerial interests, and question the quality of
instrumental standards that would be promulgated. While a benevolent, disinterested, and
omniscient social planner could make positive use of instrumental accounting, the politics
of standard setting should lead us to question whether adding instrumental accounting to
the regulatory tool kit would increase or decrease social welfare.
There is certainly reason to be concerned about lobbying costs and regulatory
capture if instrumental accounting were to become the norm. Corporate managers would
have a very strong interest in lobbying Congress and whatever committees Congress
empowered to oversee financial accounting for earnings-increasing standards, and it is
not at all clear that there would be any effective lobbying interests countering them.235
Creditors would be hurt by earnings-increasing standards that undermined the protection
of debt covenants, but dispersed bond holders, for example, should not be expected to
form an effective lobby. Moreover, as discussed above,236 the rational move for creditors
might be to negotiate covenants relying on frozen GAAP, rather than fighting
management over accounting standards forming the basis for floating GAAP covenants.
Shifting to frozen GAAP would not eliminate managers’ lobbying incentive, but it would
remove a potential, though weak, countervailing lobbying force. Finally, auditors and
accountants certainly have an interest in accounting standards, but they are more likely to
be concerned about the consistency and ease of administration of the rules than their
substance.
Accounting commentators have worried that eliminating economic neutrality as a
guiding principle of the standard setting process would lead to a lobbying frenzy and
severely undermine principled standard setting.237 That is not to say that lobbying does
not occur today or that it is totally ineffective. There is evidence that corporations
effectively lobby the FASB.238 But casual observation suggests that corporate lobbying
with respect to accounting standards does not approach lobbying of tax writers. Perhaps
that is because managers care more about taxes than reported earnings, but I strongly
doubt it. It is more likely that the difference arises from the belief that the FASB, with its
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focus on neutrality, rejection of non-accounting policy considerations, and insulation
from the electoral process, is less susceptible to lobbying than Congress.239
Congress has rarely intervened in the standard setting process, but its occasional
interventions give us some clues about the welfare implications of instrumental
accounting. Two examples demonstrate the promise and the peril:
One of the most significant interventions by Congress and the SEC in substantive
standards occurred in the early 1960s after Congress enacted an investment tax credit.
Although the tax legislation provided for immediate “flow-through” tax benefits, the
Accounting Principles Board (FASB’s predecessor) issued an opinion requiring that the
tax benefits be spread over the lives of the assets purchased for financial reporting
purposes.240 This conservative approach reduced the favorable earnings impact of the tax
legislation (versus a parallel flow-through financial accounting approach). The
accounting profession was split on the proper treatment, but business leaders lobbied hard
for flow-through accounting.241 The SEC took the unusual step of overturning the APB’s
opinion with its own opinion allowing either accounting method to be used.242 About a
decade later, Congress enacted a new version of the investment tax credit and specified in
the legislation that either accounting approach would be acceptable – a rare case of
Congress engaging in instrumental accounting.243 In my view, these were positive
interventions. By permitting flow-through accounting of the tax benefits, Congress and
the SEC boosted the incentive provided by the investment tax credit with no additional
cost to the fisc and little loss of information to the financial markets.
The other example involves only threatened intervention and takes us back to the
stock option expensing story. As discussed above, the FASB struggled for a decade
before successfully implementing a requirement that stock option expense be recognized
consistent with other forms of compensation. Corporate interests strongly resisted this
earnings-reducing change in standards and several times enlisted the help of various
members of Congress in pressuring the FASB to slow or water down its proposals. To be
fair, other members of Congress supported the FASB’s efforts, but had the primary
responsibility for this standard rested with Congress, I have no doubt that the corporate
interests would have prevailed. Expensing stock options will discourage their use and the
new standard can be seen as an unwarranted brake on a popular compensation technique.
In my view, the old option expense footnoting regime provided an inappropriate
accounting preference for one particular type of compensation, leading to inefficient
distortions in pay practices, i.e., over-reliance on options, and a particular form of options
at that. The problem, of course, is that this story is not about a difference of opinion
239

According to the economic theory of regulation, lobbying expenditure is a function of the
potential payoff from lobbying. See supra note 152 and accompanying text. All else being equal, the
expected return on lobbying a more compliant regulator is greater than the return on lobbying a less
compliant regulator.
240
See Gary John Previts & Dale L. Flesher, A Perspective on the New Deal and Financial
Reporting: Andrew Barr and the Securities Exchange Commission, 1938-1972, 23 BUS. & ECON. HIS.
221, 226 (1994); Joel Seligman, The SEC and Accounting: A Historical Perspective, in THE SEC AND
ACCOUNTING: THE FIRST 50 YEARS: 1984 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARTHUR YOUNG PROFESSORS’
ROUNDTABLE 3, 19 (Robert H. Mundheim & Noyes E. Leech eds., 1984)
241
See Seligman, supra note 240, at 19.
242
See id.; Previts & Flesher, supra note 240, at 226; David Solomons, The Political Implications
of Accounting and Accounting Standard Setting, 13 ACCT. & BUS. RES. 107, 117 (1983).
243
See Previts & Flesher, supra note 240, at 226.

52

ACCOUNTING AND CORPORATE BEHAVIOR
regarding the merits of stock options, it is about managerial interests that differ from
shareholder interests and the likelihood that Congress will cater to management interests.
In my view, the problem of regulatory capture and the resulting likelihood that a
Congress that embraced instrumental use of accounting standards would produce as many
poor standards as good ones probably dooms the enterprise. Perhaps this is an unduly
pessimistic view of Washington, but the view seems warranted. Of course, one can make
the same point about tax incentives. The difference is that congressional involvement in
the tax writing process is inevitable. That is not the case with the financial standard
setting process, but more on that after we consider a few other potential costs and benefits
of instrumental accounting.
4. Institutionalization of the Importance of Reported Earnings
The idea behind instrumental accounting is to harness managers’ irrational or
rational but self-serving bias, which inflates the importance of reported earnings, in order
to shape corporate behavior and increase social welfare. There is an inherent perversity
in this idea, in that shareholder welfare would be increased if managers could be educated
or disciplined into abandoning the bias in the first place. One might be concerned that
explicit introduction of accounting incentives into GAAP would somehow institutionalize
managers’ earnings fixation and lead us further from the happy day in which managers
fully understand and internalize the ECMH and positive accounting theory.
5. Conflict with International Convergence of Accounting Standards
In 2002, the FASB and the International Accounting Standards Board entered into
a memorandum of understanding pledging to work towards “high-quality, compatible
accounting standards that could be used for both domestic and cross-border financial
reporting.”244 Currently, there is no single set of accounting principles that is generally
acceptable in all capital markets, and international convergence would result in obvious
efficiencies.
Incorporating explicit accounting incentives into U.S. GAAP could undermine
efforts to achieve international accounting convergence. For example, financial
depreciation schedules that were regularly adjusted to fine-tune the incentives for U.S.
companies to invest in certain asset classes would be problematic for convergence and
add to the administrative burden of foreign firms attempting to list their shares on U.S.
markets.
Without attempting to fully solve this problem here, a number of observations are
in order. First, it would appear that the negative effect on international convergence
could be minimized by limiting accounting incentives to a few discrete issues, such as
financial depreciation, and by implementing the incentives in such a way as to avoid
information loss, e.g., by employing the stock option “footnoting” technique. These are
the same techniques that were suggested above as means of minimizing the loss of
information in deviating from economic accounting, so introduction of the international
convergence issue simply reinforces the reasons for cabining accounting incentives.
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Second, it should be noted that calls for increased book-tax conformity raise the same
issue unless one believes that the systems would be conformed at economic accounting,
which seems unlikely. In both cases, the reduction in international convergence is a cost
of the proposal that must be weighed against the benefits.
6. Other Costs (and Benefits) of Instrumental Accounting
In a number of important articles and books Stanley Surrey and Paul McDaniel
exposed the inefficiencies of providing business incentives through the tax system rather
than through direct subsidies.245 Accounting incentives would share many, but not all, of
these inefficiencies.
One of Surrey and McDaniel’s primary complaints was that tax incentives bypass
the Congressional committees and regulatory agencies that have the relevant subject
matter expertise, e.g., agriculture, manufacturing, etc.246 Not only is there a loss of
expertise when this occurs, but a loss of coordination. Assuming that Congress patterned
accounting incentive institutions on the tax model, this complaint would be equally valid.
Of course, this institutional framework is not inevitable. Congress could decide that the
various subject matter committees could employ accounting incentives as a policy tool in
coordination with direct subsidies and other incentives. This alternative approach could
result in the opposite coordination problem, different committees imposing different or
conflicting accounting standards. This is not the place to work out a detailed regulatory
scheme for the promulgation of accounting incentives, but two points should be
emphasized: coordination problems and loss of expertise might arise in the promulgation
of accounting incentives, but the problems inherent in the tax model potentially could be
mitigated.
Another complaint was that tax incentives were open ended.247 Unlike direct
subsidies that must pass through an appropriations process every year, tax incentives,
once enacted, remain until they are eliminated or revised by future legislation.
Accounting incentives would be similarly open ended. Because accounting incentives
have no direct impact on the public fisc, however, it is not clear that this is a significant
problem.248
A further concern was that tax incentives damage the tax system through
introducing complexity and inconsistency.249 This risk would exist for accounting
incentives as well. Ideally, Congress would impose just a few narrowly tailored
accounting incentives that were designed to preserve relevant financial information while
encouraging worthwhile economic behavior. But it is entirely possible that once the
camel’s nose breached the tent we would wind up with a volume of accounting standards

245

See Surrey, supra note 218; STANLEY S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM: THE CONCEPT
(1973); STANLEY S. SURREY & PAUL R. MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES (1985).
246
See Surrey, supra note 218, at 728; SURREY & MCDANIEL, supra note 245, at 106.
247
See SURREY, supra note 245, at 729-30 & n. 34.
248
For that matter, tax incentives are much less open ended than they used to be. Increasingly, tax
incentive provisions are enacted for a limited period and must be affirmatively renewed to continue in
force. See, e.g., IRC § 168(k) (titled, “Special [Depreciation] Allowance for Certain Property Acquired
After September 10, 2001, and Before January 1, 2005”).
249
See SURREY, supra note 245, at 731-32; SURREY & MCDANIEL, supra note 245, at 105-06.
OF TAX EXPENDITURES

54

ACCOUNTING AND CORPORATE BEHAVIOR
that rivaled the tax code. This issue is sufficiently serious that it is discussed more fully
in the next section.
Accounting incentives would be similar to tax incentives in other ways. Both
mechanisms generally are very blunt tools for economic intervention. Consider the
corporate deduction for charitable contributions. For firms paying tax at the top marginal
rate, this deduction amounts to a 35% governmental subsidy for charitable gifts. Is it
likely that Congress actually thinks that 35% is the right level of subsidy? Why not 25%
or 50%? And what about the startup firm with no net taxable income that has tax losses
that can be carried forward for many years? The effective subsidy in that case rapidly
approaches zero. Is that what Congress intended? In some cases, principally tax
depreciation and investment tax credits, Congress has actively managed tax incentives.
More often than not, however, they serve as a very blunt instrument.
Accounting incentives would suffer from the same defect. Decelerated financial
depreciation could be fine tuned based on experience, but shifting an expense from
income statement to footnote would have a dollar for dollar impact on reported earnings,
whether this level of earnings impact would provide the right level of incentive or not.
On the other hand, tax and accounting incentives share an advantage with direct
subsidies relative to legal mandates in allowing for heterogeneous responses. Assuming
that Congress merely wants to encourage an activity and not require it, tax and
accounting incentives as well as direct subsidies allow businesses to determine whether
the carrot is sufficiently attractive to merit the change. However, all of these pros and
cons are simply further factors to be taken into account in determining whether
instrumental accounting is a viable tool for implementing government policy in a second
best world.
D. Thinking about Accounting Incentives in a Second Best World
It may be useful to think about accounting incentives in the context of the tax
simplification debate. The issues are similar. Undoubtedly, the tax system could be
more efficiently administered if stripped of various economic incentives such as the home
mortgage interest deduction, the deduction for charitable contributions, the earned
income tax credit, and the exclusion for employer provided health insurance. But we live
in a second best world. Assuming one believes that government has a legitimate role to
play in shaping economic behavior (or even if one believes that government inevitably
will play that role whether it is legitimate or not), the appropriate question is what
combination of tax rules, legal mandates, governmental spending programs, and, perhaps,
accounting standards, most efficiently raises the revenue, shapes the behavior, delivers
the services, and provides the information. Congress only has so many levers it can use
to direct economic behavior. None is cost free.
David Weisbach and Jacob Nussim have recently made this point with respect to
tax incentives. As they say, “[t]he government will, sometimes for the better and
sometimes for the worse, subsidize, penalize, or regulate various activities, and we must
decide how this should be done.”250 They argue that it is mistake to focus narrowly on
the effect of a tax incentive on the complexity and efficiency of the tax code; rather one
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must consider broader institutional design considerations in determining whether it is
appropriate to deliver incentives through the tax code.251
A similar argument could be made for instrumental use of accounting.
Accounting researchers bemoan potential degradation of financial information, but there
is no reason to think that maximum value-relevance of financial statements should
supersede all other considerations. But there is also a fundamental difference between
accounting and tax. Congressional involvement in the federal tax system is unavoidable,
and thus lobbying and regulatory capture problems in this arena are endemic. This is not
true of financial accounting. With one or two exceptions, Congress historically has not
involved itself with substantive accounting rules. We should, therefore, think twice
before inviting the camel’s nose into this particular tent. While one can dream of an allwise and wholly public-spirited Congress tweaking one or two accounting rules to
provide helpful incentives to business, the nightmare scenario of one-off, special interest
driven accounting rules looms large. As noted above, the constituency with the greatest
interest in accounting standards and strongest incentive to lobby is corporate
management.252 The concern, then, is not that inefficient governmental economic
intervention would simply shift from tax incentives or direct subsidies to accounting
incentives, but that opening up a new venue for intervention would result in incremental
social costs, including increased lobbying and regulatory costs, that offset the fiscal and
other advantages instrumental accounting would provide.
Still, given the power and economy of financial accounting standards, it is
tempting to propose limited consideration of accounting incentives, perhaps as a tiebreaker in situations in which the proper accounting treatment of an item is subject to
legitimate debate within the accounting profession or possibly with respect to items for
which the accounting treatment is admittedly arbitrary to begin with. A good example of
the former case was the resolution of the disagreement over the accounting treatment of
the investment tax credit. But, of course, distinguishing legitimate debate from
concocted accounting controversies designed to advance special interest would not be
easy. I would place the debate over the FASB’s proposal to require expensing of
compensatory stock options in the latter category.
The best example of an arbitrary accounting standard is probably financial
depreciation. The benefits of allowing firms to utilize more decelerated financial
depreciation methods than are permissible today would seem to outweigh the costs. But,
again, aspects of many standards could be deemed arbitrary, and limiting intervention to
this subset of standards would not be easy.
If instrumental accounting could be limited to breaking ties in cases of legitimate
accounting controversy or adjusting arbitrary standards to take the pressure off of tax
incentives and direct subsidies, there could be significant social gains. I would welcome
suggestions along these lines. However, without reason to think that intervention could
be limited, the risks of encouraging intervention seem to outweigh the gains. And this
brings us back to the book-tax conformity debate. While increased conformity may be
advantageous in isolation, we should be concerned that encouraging Congress to
intervene in financial accounting in the name of conformity could start us down the road
towards wholesale politicization of the standard setting process.
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CONCLUSION
Using financial accounting standards to help shape corporate behavior is a
provocative idea, but whether instrumental accounting ultimately is embraced as a public
policy tool is to some degree secondary. The main argument of this Article has been that
accounting standards shape corporate behavior, whether we recognize the fact or not, and
that this power of accounting has important public policy implications. We cannot
adequately evaluate calls for increased book-tax conformity or other proposals with
accounting implications without taking the incentive properties of accounting rules into
consideration.
Even more generally, it is regrettable that there is so little cross-fertilization of
ideas between researchers focused on accounting and those specializing in law and
corporate governance. Positive accounting theory may not be a complete explanation for
why accounting matters, but it is an important theory with a rich empirical literature that
corporate governance scholars must reckon with. On the other hand, accounting
researchers would benefit from more thorough incorporation of agency theory into their
models. Accounting is too important to be left to accountants, and much too important to
be left to the unquestioned discretion of corporate managers. Further research building
on the groundwork laid by several disciplines is needed to provide a fuller account of
why and how accounting matters, what we can and should expect from managers faced
with accounting and accounting-sensitive operational choices, and the proper policy role
for financial accounting standards.
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